


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A NEW

THEORY OF HUMAN NATURE,

With a correspondent SYSTEM of

EDUCATION:

Together with a

PREFACE.

By Counsellor BAUMGARTEN.

Translated from the GERMAN.

*Videntur nobis homines nec opes nec vires suas bene nosse,
verum de illis majora quam par est, de his minora
credere. Constituamus scientiam unam generalem,
de natura ut emancipetur hæc sententia et in scien-
tiam seorsum redigatur.*

F. BACON, *Verulam.*

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T H E
P R E F A C E.



W H E T H E R children are men? Whether the men, best known to us, are not all of them children? Whether those new-comers into the world, have more need to learn from these old-standers, or these from them? Whether we are ruled by fatalities, by which any one may be compelled to grieve that ever he was born, or at least, that he has reached an age to be responsible for his life? Whether he to whom great hopes, liberties and tow-

ering expectations of happiness, have been permitted, must not also necessarily have seen himself subjected to severe admonitions, menaces, coercions and actual dangers? And whether in the plan laid down by an all-wise over-ruling hand, concerning all our vicissitudes, any real defect be discoverable by us; or it may admit of improvement; or how it is conceivable, that scarce one among a thousand are acquainted with the rules thereof, yet all follow them? And that though the rule be above all amendment, yet most events, which fall out according to it, are either subjects of contempt, pity or horror, mean or infamous in their motives, unfortunate and calamitous in their consequences? He who cannot solve these questions, in a manner satisfactory to his own love of truth, must own that sufficient care has not been taken with him, to render agreeable and advantageous his arrival, stay and services, among
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P R E F A C E.

v

the multitude of those, with whom, sometimes, it is an affront to be called a man ; and at other times, they account a kind of deification, and talk in the most pompous terms of the dignity of their transcendent nature. It is indeed an ingenious and pointed thought of the Marchioness *de Sablée*, where she rather ridicules, than accounts for, the general negligence of men in enquiring, not only after their own worth, but that of their whole sex ; imputing it rather to a complaisant apprehensiveness, than to inadvertency : *Men*, says this lady, *are held in most account, when the grasp of their abilities is not known ; as things but half seen are always most presumed of* *.

Whoever has been employed in the education of young persons, may, possibly, in this reflection find several solutions of

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* On fait plus de cas des hommes, quand on ne connoit point jusqu'où peut aller leur suffisance ; car on presume toujours d'avantage des choses que l'on ne voit qu'à demi.

the daily conduct of parents ; in what rests those gifts of prophecy, by which they so assuredly see the future utility and importance of their darlings ; why they owe so little thanks to those, who would be serviceable to them, and why they expect their comforts, from the precarious remedies of time, rather than from a sedulous observance of the duties incumbent on parents ; particularly, why in the choice of those persons to be intrusted with the inspection, or rather the entire formation of their children, they proceed in a manner, unnatural to the highest degree. But in reality, it is an ungrateful arraignment of the Creator, a precipitate mistrust of ourselves, and our fellow-creatures ; a device for justifying the most unbecoming negligences, and a pretence for invalidating the most powerful truths ; by the prevalency of which, the public welfare would see a period of its most antient complaints, when, among the multifarious

multifarious efforts of a false ambition, we fix the rank, which it is every man's duty to sustain, different from whatever is indisputably beneath, or above a man ; decide of his abilities, not according to what he could and would do, but what he formerly used in a dissolute waste of life, and thus deprive ourselves of the benefit of those impediments, which in this state of probation are every where permitted ; that no body casually, or by imaginary merits, but that all, by a rational acceptance, and most effectual use of the good gifts tendered to them, may attain to a lasting felicity.

Quite different were the sentiments of *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus*, who has immortalized himself more by his genius than his dignity. *I must never forget*, says the imperial philosopher, *neither the nature of other things, nor my own, nor the relation of the latter to the former ; which is a part, and which the whole ; and*
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that nothing prohibit thee from doing and knowing, without exception, whatever nature, of which thou art a part, enjoins thee to do and know.

And in a another place. *This one thing only troubles me, lest I may project the doing of what the human constitution will never allow of, or in a different manner, or will not allow of at present.* Religion, which in all its precepts requires vigilance, self-examination, self-conquest, and a voluntary choice of what is best ; which would habituate us in our judgments of things, never to side with the majority, as now we cannot hear those, whom an awful experience beyond the grave, has delivered from the weaknesses, which the first appearances of things occasion, but simply to trust that voice alone, which the old man and the child, may know to be a revelation of truth : Religion, which does not more insist on the past by reproaches and traditions,

P R E F A C E. ix

traditions, nor on the future, by raising in us fears and hopes, as on the present, that without delay we love and hate what, at this time, deserves such determinations of our fluctuating sentiments: Religion, which can elucidate all obscurities in human nature, repair its breaches, and animate our terrene pusillanimity with the all-sufficient incentives of heavenly consolations and decrees ; this religion, so common to our nature, could long since have diffused light and certitude among us, to have imparted to every age, and both sexes of mortals, a knowledge of the law of nature, by which a sincere capacity would have discovered what is Grace. But our fathers have eaten sour grapes and our teeth are set on edge. Far be it from us to propagate the mischief ! Oh, that our prosterity may have no charge against us, of having precluded christianity from them, and that we knew not how to educate them ; that we are called christians, as we are

are called men, but with so little understanding and sense of both names, that whether we ought to be ashamed of them, or glory in them, was more than we seemed to know. Patriot minds, of themselves, without any exhortations, are fully sensible of what is to be wished for against such an evil, and how such wishes must be carried into effect; and among these, may most justly be classed our valuable countryman, the author of the following essay, which I here with pleasure recommend to all persons of judgment, who lay to heart our prevalent evils. About two years ago, he was pleased to communicate to me the first sketch of this work, but which, in matter and manner, had very little affinity with its present appearance; yet then was so different from the usual scheme of children's relations, that I acknowledge to have used every solicitation fit to be offered to a person, whom neither a vain ambition,

ambition, nor any meaner impulse, had
duced to set up for a writer ; but who
was under obligations not to deprive
the public of his judicious compofure.
His particular opportunities and talents
for knowing human nature, as innate,
whilft yet unfophifticated ; his ingenious
and benevolent zeal, in employing his
various abilities in fuch enquiries ; the ge-
nerofity with which, in this his prefent
plan, many things were facilitated to
him, which otherwife put the moft
praise-worthy refolutions to a pause. All
this relates to occurrences, the men-
tion of which could only be promo-
tive of prejudices. Yet how is it to be
hoped, that difcipline and order, virtue
and fidelity, fhould ever mend the prefent
manners, when our objection is fuch,
that nothing is admired, but what
has been admired by the great, in
whole manner of living there is fo very
little of the rational ! However, in refpect
of

of the worthy author, I conclude with these just lines of *Rousseau*.

Celui dont la balance equitable et severe
Sait peser l'homme au poids de la réalité,
En payant son tribut aux vertus qu'il revere
Peut braver les regards de la posterité.

Nath. Baumgarten.

*Berlin, 5th of
April, 1753.*



T H E O R Y



THEORY

OF

Mankind *and* Education.

PART I.

Of Nature in general.

§. I.



A little sufficient is the general idea of perfection, to discover what is decent, lovely, great, noble, and exalted, in a thing, as a general notion of countries, and the history of them, to form a statesman; or a random

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sketch

sketch to compose a finished piece of painting. The clearness of ideas is of so little help in our errors, in the conceptions of eminent qualities, and glorious actions, that we might rather wish for some obscurity, or that tender and happy sensation which immediately distinguishes the beautiful, the middling, and the mean ; for, to developé multiplicities, and their congruity, does not belong to an ordinary capacity ; though, as to this idea of perfection, it does not require a first-rate genius.

§. 2.

This great capacity, formed upon the best models, and carried to a degree of wonderful force, is that, which among all judges of fine thinking, has, in all ages, rendered the works of the antients so highly esteemed, and gained them the pre-eminence among all the
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the products of genius. So certain is this, that persons of an exquisite taste, even the celebrated writers of our times, are unanimous in declaring the energy with which they have emulated the ancients, to be a fruit of such endeavours ; the finest parts of their writings to be imitation ; and those monuments of antiquity, to be (without exception) unequalled master-pieces. The fine arts are imitations of nature. Accordingly the connoisseurs, in their eulogiums on the ancients, say nothing more than, that in their pictures they exactly hit nature ; and likewise must have had more than a common knowledge of it. Possibly they took their models more immediately from nature, or worked for such times when taste was not sunk into such a general depravity ; and when, without such singular merit, no countenance or approbation was to be expected. For a better judgment is formed from an imperfect

4 THEORY of

taste, than without any taste; or when it is vitiated by an erroneous instruction.

§. 3.

Cicero, who, besides the merit of fine thoughts, must also have used intense application in oratory, by which he so eminently raised himself, undertakes, in a particular treatise, to form a young orator; and, possibly, never was a work undertaken with a more adequate capacity. In proof of what we have said above, we shall cite from it a passage, wherein he thus exhibits the characters of great natural parts. “ That genius, “ says he, *Lib. II. Orat.* seems to me “ most desirable, which, in expression, “ and the flow of thought, is rather bold “ than timid; rather impetuous than “ reptile. It is easier, continues he, to “ check and guide the vehemence of “ nature, than to animate and strengthen “ the

“ the weakness thereof.” He refers it to experience, whether a skilful hand has not much less trouble in pruning a plant, which shoots out superfluous twigs, than in nursing another of a very feeble constitution ; and, by art, to supply the defects of nature.

§. 4.

This idea, omitting only what relates to the orator, being more generally enlarged upon, we shall find therein a description of a child of pregnant parts. This cannot be doubted of by any who know, that all mental gifts are stifled by repressing the vivacity of a child ; that great faults are connected with great accomplishments ; and that the parts of a very hopeful child are generally very limited ; but must, if the manner of education, which, according to Cicero, is so very like the oeconomy of a gar-

dener, perfectly correspond with the nature of the child ; or, is this one of those comparisons which prove nothing ? The importance of the point very well deserves a more particular enquiry ; for although Cicero, was a distinguished statesman and orator, and especially in high reputation for learning, in his time, when literature did not consist in empty speculations, and truths known only to be known, or to obtain a degree ; yet was he but an indifferent philosopher.

§. 5.

I have often reflected on it, and objected, that all which Cicero advanced is grounded upon the most accurate observation, and agrees with the justest experiments of all times. This will be granted me without opposition ; but withal it is replied, that his propositions are deficient in brevity, and his proofs in solidity

dity and precision ; a fault, which, were it to spread, would confound the limits of truth and falshood, and deprive our knowledge of all certitude. Of this it is further urged, we have an evident instance in imaginative composures, as fables and narratives, written in this taste ; they afford indeed some truth, and are read with pleasure ; but no man was ever thoroughly convinced by them.

§. 6.

I pitied that fine genius, or rather our solid times, that they have not produced one man, who, by works of solidity, has placed them in that degree of fame, to which he raised his by works of taste ; yet it occurred to me, that possibly it was the destiny of antient and modern times, that the former should discover truth ; but the latter lay open the grounds, proofs, and relations of them. These thoughts were occasioned by many small

8 T H E O R Y *of*

pieces of antiquity, in succeeding times, swelled by profound notes, to many bulky volumes. I also counted myself under a kind of obligation to employ, in the service of truth, what abilities I have acquired by reading solid composures ; and, by a chain of inferences, to establish the truth of Cicero's proposition on an unshaken basis. And as the propriety, and the justness, and real merit, of every manner of education, and likewise that mentioned by Cicero, must be estimated from its conformity to nature ; so, and even otherwise, a proof from nature, as it appeared to Cicero, if not of absolute necessity, is far from being superfluous.

§. 7.

The capital position which is to be proved by us, shall be the following. There are great and small faults ; the former, which declare themselves only
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in such children, who, by nature, and at the origination of their faculties, are appointed for something great ; as the latter are peculiar to children of ordinary parts. The proof hereof is this : All the operations of nature are so many views of its wise author, which he carries on by the different limitations of power, as by so many means. In so wise a scheme as nature is, there must be, betwixt the means and end, even in respect of their greatness, a just and invariable proportion ; consequently from the appointed degree of the strength, the greatness of the appointment may be justly inferred.

Certain faults spring from great natural gifts ; and thus a high destination may be inferred even from certain faults.

§. 8.

Be it either by faults, or accomplishments, will it be objected, that the greatness of the genius is to be determined? yet, from the little knowledge we have of men, they may be so insufficient, that, as in other things with which we are as little acquainted, we must refer it to the consequences. Our insight into human nature does not indeed reach far; but does that render any farther knowledge than what we are possessed of unattainable; or, if it be attainable is it in any other manner than by calculating the proportion of the first faculties of a child, to the future greatness of a man. Nobody will maintain the former; and whoever doubts of the latter, may very well think that this is no proof to us.

§. 9.

§. 9.

A power, be it supposed ever so great, meeting with such an external opposition to its efforts, that to overcome the resistance, must either employ the whole or in part, there can follow either no operation, or no proportionate operation; *atque*, the power of the soul, *ergo*, the greatness of the power, must be determined by its operations, taken collectively; the surmounting of the resistance likewise also belongs to the operations of the power; and these must be determined by their abstracted effects. And when these, by the greatness of the resistance, do not follow, this proposition may also be inverted; and it may be said the greatness of the resistance must be determined by the greatness of the power; for power and resistance are properly two forces acting upon each other, by
oppo-

opposite directions, and serve as a measurement to each other. He who is not acquainted with a power, must be ignorant of what operations it may be productive of ; and he, to whom the resistance is unknown, must likewise be ignorant of the cause, whereby the effects, which were expected, do not follow ; what then will thus be the consequence, on which a judgment is to be formed ; and what will the judgment be ? possibly thereby is meant, cultivate the ground as it used to be an hundred years ago or more, a good soil will yield as good products now as formerly, and it is but lost labour to go about mending a bad one.

§. 10.

I was aware that the proof, strong as it is, would not work the desired conviction ; from the case of Xanthus and
others

others of a similar disposition, I have long since been induced to think, that forcible proofs can make any particular impression only on those, who have previously agreed on the number of truths, and the language in which they shall be delivered. Although it be otherwise my firm opinion, that truth ever carries conviction with it, when rendered intelligible, that is, when exhibited in a manner which coincides with the sentiments and experience of all mankind.

§. II.

Xanthus, that renowned philosopher, ventures out of his usual verge, and holds discourse with a gardiner, on a question relating to the earth, why weeds, with all the diligence of man, to destroy and root them up, thrive better than the good plants, though tended with so much skill and sedulity ;
Xan-

Xanthus discusses the point, with his wonted profundity, nearly in the same manner as is practised in other argumentations; his reasoning being further supported by his own celebrity and elocution, yet the gardiner, from his knowledge of nature, was so little satisfied with it, that the sagacious Æsop, seeing his master's reputation at stake, desired he would leave him to answer such a simple question, too mean for a philosopher; the master, who, from several specimens, was not unacquainted with his servant's ingenuity, and who also could not but be pleased with Æsop's interposition to save his honour, readily complied, and thus revenged himself on the contradictory gardiner.

§. 12.

Æsop, with all the solemn confidence of a philosopher, who is about to promul-

mulgate truths, before unknown, makes answer, that there is no such thing in all nature as a weed, but having once settled our fancies on certain tribes of vegetables, and from mere self-love and partiality, interesting ourselves in the prosperity of these our favourites, and that all the rest, which yet to nature are of equal concern, we sacrifice to this humour of ours. We do the same unjust violence to nature, as it would be to a mother, to take away her child, and require that she should bring up a changeling, with all the care of a maternal tenderness ; for the plants which we call weeds, are the legitimate children of every soil, whereas the foreign plants are only adventitious, or spurious children.

§. 13.

Whether the answer of the slave or of the master was most to the purpose, is not a point of farther examination ; it was enough that this inquisitive gardener was most satisfied with the former, and possibly, as he learned in general from thence, that nature will not suffer itself to be dictated to by our conceits, or, which more nearly concerns a gardener, he perceived that the thriving of a plant, in a strange soil, was answerable to its homogeniousefness with the spontaneous products of that soil ; every soil being adapted only for certain vegetables, must be altered to fit it for the reception and nourishment of exotics ; an information sufficiently perspicuous to gain the acquiescence of the trade, without launching into the more abstruse reasons.

§. 14.

§. 14.

Perhaps Cicero teaches us a truth no less advantageous, and teaches it almost in the same manner; possibly the inference made from one of the natural kingdoms to another is not so uncertain; nature, throughout the whole extent of her works, proceeding on simple and general principles, we shall here adduce a part of the natural history of the vegetable kingdom, for observing from thence the law of nature, and investigating whether by them may be cleared up the occurrences of a superior kingdom: Here possibly arise some small questions, *viz.* what rank in the circle of visible things, belongs to man, as the master-piece of the creation? are reason and liberty his privileges? how far they are so? whether nature expects the assistance of art? and how far she expects it?
these

these and the like questions, besides their influence on education, will appear weighty to those, who know that there are people who will be naturalists, right or wrong, and others who vehemently oppose them ; yet neither the one or the other knowing what nature is.

§. 15.

We now come to our history ; a seed, minute as it is, yet contains in it a perfect plant, as the animalcule in which is lodged the germen of an animate being ; the soil which it either naturally delights in, or which art accommodates to it, contributes to its growth and progress, no further than as having in readiness the nutritive saps, which these embryo plants imbibe through tubes of inconceivable fineness, as the means of its vegetation ; how this is performed we are taught

taught by the naturalists ; who, after laborious researches, by which they have thoroughly penetrated into the texture and formation of these plants, have found that these nutritious saps, by a contrivance of admirable wisdom, is conveyed from vessel to vessel, that the greater parts may be insensibly detached, and the sap, by frequent elutriations, be more and more prepared for its being a proper aliment for the plant, towards its future produce.

§. 16.

But, were we unacquainted with the means by which a plant is brought to answer the end of its being ; yet, the least attention immediately shows us that its endeavours to this end, begins with the primary disclosure of the seed, and the first appearance of the shoot ; and that, a failure of its end, is as little charge-

chargeable to any want of propriety in the means, as the natural impulse grounded thereon. This we see; and this is declared by all who are conversant either with gardening or agriculture; but when a plant, being anatomized, we come to have a distinct and clear view of the disposition of the constituent parts of the plant, and of the connection of these tubes and vessels, this point becomes so palpable, and the best and most advantageous means are laid down with such wisdom, that when the expected effects are fully answered, there is still less cause of wonder than when they fail.

§. 17.

Even art, which brings up plants by laws seemingly contradictory to nature, and, in appearance, extorts from nature what without such compulsion it seems to refuse; even this very art confirms

firms this in a manner beyond all doubt, making nature the rule of its process.

The first thing which here presents itself to every one, is the known improvement which art designs by ingrafting a cion, or bud. But is not this cion, though cut off, and this bud, though detached, a compleat plant? The only difference from other plants is, that from the tenderness of their nature, they require a supply of juices more thoroughly maturated, and either they cannot be furnished with it, by the soil itself, or, at least, not in our northern climate. Thus the expedient is, to ingraft them into a vegetating wood, where they find the nutriment they delight in; a proceeding, perfectly consentaneous to nature's view, of perpetuating itself, by the most careful support, not of genuses and species, but even of individuals: the economy of the means used to this end is various, but universally

fally agreeing, by one way or other, to render the desired consequence infallible. This bud incloses a small plant, which again contains the fruit and its leaves. This lusty shoot gives the tree the necessary largeness and strength; that which, on account of its weakness, seems to promise little or nothing, will adorn it with fruit; root out either, or both, nature will still find a resource for compassing its end.

§. 18.

This is the gardener's province; he looks upon his garden as a district separated from the other vegetable kingdoms, in which his gratifications must be limited by the rules of his experience. It is true, he improves nature; but it is at its own expence. Here he roots up trees, and transplants them to another exposure, according to his particular views. This
under-

undertaking succeeds, whilst he makes use of the means which were still extant in nature; the use of any other means, which possibly might have been productive of better effects, being denied to him. However, this cannot be said to be an actual service done to nature; this name being due to such skill only which removes the various obstacles embarrassing the endeavours of unerring nature.

§. 19.

The care of finding a proper soil for trees, of placing them at a due distance for the free admission both of the sun and air; and in an exposure safe from the inclemencies of the weather, and other noxious accidents; this caution, I say, only concerns the outward circumstances of a plant; yet, beyond these externals, no art can reach. About these the gardener employs himself; and on them depends

depends the fate of a tree. “ In this
“ garden, says one, art and nature pre-
“ side alternately, and with equal
“ power ; here is the most regular or-
“ der, exact symmetry and elegant con-
“ formity of all parts with one another ;
“ a complete harmony reigns through-
“ out the whole ; there, again, is rude-
“ ness and confusion ; parts without
“ a whole, whole without parts ; and
“ without beginning or end ; losing
“ themselves amidst each other. Let
“ art but speak the word, the dreary
“ wilderness disappears, and gradually
“ changes to an elysium of regularity
“ and vegetable splendor ; and that part
“ which seemed to pride itself in its
“ order and elegancy, if art withdraws
“ its creative hand, will return to its
“ primordial confusion.” Is nature
thus an irregular impulse, without any
certain direction ; and art the su-
preme power by which every thing is
kept in order ? I don’t question but this
is

is the opinion of many who set nature and art in competition ; although it is plain, that nature, as the economy of the highest wisdom, can admit of no amendment.

§. 20:

Nor of degeneracy? Yes, such a thing is possible ; but all the help which nature requires from art, consists wholly in endeavouring, by means grounded in nature, to prevent this degeneracy. It is easily seen, that, by thus setting bounds to the operations of art, it loses nothing of its value. It is still of importance ; it imparts to nature a degree of perfection, which, without it, would not have been : Intelligent in the laws of nature, it directs the former in following the latter. Art is a collection of all the observations and experiments relative to a subject, or its circumstances. For, to judge rightly
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of the nature of a thing, we must take in all its operations ; but the operations being liable to be interrupted, by an external force acting in direct opposition, which is called resistance, he is but half acquainted with nature, who, at the same time, does not understand the quantity of the resistance, or the proportion of the impression made by outward things.

§. 21.

Further, a power limited to one certain end is nature ; and the endeavours used for that end is its tendency ; the resistance which nature encounters from without, and cannot remove by its own strength, either is only an equilibre to it ; and then follows a suspension of all operations on both sides ; or preponderating on one side, effects are produced quite contrary to nature. Whoever will infer the nature only from the operations, without

out taking the resistance into consideration, will, in many cases, account that very natural, which is quite the reverse. All that we have here observed, is confirmed by the naturalists, who, not resting in mere observations of nature, as it offers itself to them ; but, proceeding to investigations, that is, to abstract the things, into which they are desirous of penetrating, from their present connection with other things, try them in a change of circumstances for discovering whether the already-known effects are to be attributed to nature, or to an external resistance. Thus it is, that the modern natural philosophy has been brought to a degree of perfection ; in comparison of which, the antient scarce deserves to be called the first rudiments of it.

§. 22.

There is but one single case, in which all the effects which a certain given power can produce, are to be expected ; a case which must be proportionate to it, and which, in respect to this power, can alone be called natural. One and the same heavy body, for instance a bullet, now lying at rest, without motion, soon mounts with inconceivable velocity, to a certain height, from whence, after a few minutes, it is seen as swiftly to descend. The successive circumstances in which we see this bullet, are as different as the effects following from them. Now the effects of one and the same power cannot be different, much less opposite. The cause of one or other of the effects must reside in the external circumstances. According to this principle, the effects being separately examined, the inference will be
this ;

this ; rest cannot be the natural state of this heavy body, else it would, on all sides, with equal force, resist the external impulse, which yet does not happen. Its ascending motion is less so ; not only opposing it to the utmost of its power, but as soon as the elevating impression ceases, assuming quite an opposite direction. Further, that consequently the motion towards the center of the earth is the natural condition of this body, the rest unnatural, as proceeding from a resistance ; the ascending motion, contrary to nature, as the effect of an overbearing moment.

§. 23.

As in investigating the nature of a subject, it is necessary to distinguish betwixt the natural state thereof, and what is unnatural or contrary to nature, so by the preceding instance it is no less easy,

as it shews every power to be incessantly endeavouring to preserve itself in its natural state ; and when it undergoes any alteration to recover it. Our body, from its first formation, is subject to so many changes, that the regular precise proportion betwixt the impression and the resistance, in its fluids and solids, in which consists its natural state, according to the physicians who are best acquainted with this admirable frame, is not to be met with in any one person. Now, were not nature making a continual effort by all the means grounded on its wise economy, for restoring this proportion, a disorder would ensue, which, however small at first, would soon be attended with the ruin of the body. Nature never perfectly reaches its aim ; and, on this account, a state, though unnatural, if of a long duration, and we know of no other with which we can contrast it, is ever to be accounted natural. But
when,

when, from the preponderating weight on the other side, the equilibrium is in danger of being utterly destroyed, from this danger, which increases according to the vigour or flaccidity of nature's efforts, we learn, that the cessation of these efforts must involve the ruin of the body; and that this cannot happen, but by such cessation.

§. 24.

The effort of nature may also be weakened by a resistency and thereby it may contract a direction opposite to nature; but a suppression of it can never happen, without the ruin of nature being the immediate consequence. Nature is an economy founded on the wisest laws, susceptible of no amendment, and genuine acts are never seen, but when the external things, with which it is surrounded, are brought to a proportionate conformity

with it. Likewise a just distinction betwixt the effects proceeding from pure nature, and those caused by the impressions of outward things that is betwixt their natural and unnatural condition, is the surest inlet to a knowledge of nature. And this is easy ; nature struggling, by proper means, to disengage itself from unnatural coercions, and recover its genuine condition. Shall not man, the most exalted, the noblest being, the principal link in the great chain of nature ; shall not man, who bears the image of the Deity, shew a proportionate inclination to accomplish his sublime destination, and be securely possessed of the best means for it ? If so ; how is it that we are less successful in our endeavours after a knowledge of mankind, than of any other branch of nature ? Yet this is man's greatest concern, and little more requisite to it than self-knowledge, which seems a very easy matter.

§. 25.

Thus far is certain. Man finds this world a scene too narrow and circumscribed for his faculties ; and of the man of the most eminent talents and merit, it cannot be said, that this superiority, which so conspicuously distinguishes him among his fellow-mortals, is his *ne plus ultra* ; and not because the proportion of his faculties to his destination is not demonstrable, this being far from impossible ; but because all men, though not all equally, are in an unnatural station. Man is not what, from his faculties, and the design of the Creator, he must be ; and the relation in which he stands to the things of the world, suppress all hopes of his being so here. Yet, to a man impressed with a due sense of the dignity of being a man, there can be no felicity, whilst he is not what he can and

must be. How well-grounded the expectation of a futurity, which presents us with this contemplation ! Is man here in an unnatural situation ? Is he too sublime to act the transitory part of a fleeting life ; and in the best circumstances this world affords, must some of his endowments lie unknown and unemployed. The question is, Which is the natural condition of man, and of all in which he may be placed here, that which comes nearest to it ?

§. 26.

The philosopher cries, “ Abolish riches, “ splendor, pre-eminence, the pleasures “ of sense ; or reduce them to their real “ worth.” And, on the other hand, “ Exalt human nature to that dignity “ which is its incontrovertible right.” Then will man be free from those turbulent desires by which he is now kept a stranger to himself. He is absorbed in
things

things foreign to him. Turn his thoughts inward ; and in self-improvement he will find that repose and complacency which is to be found in nothing else, but so far only as contributing thereto. This answer is too vague and indefinite. It only implies, that the things which set the whole world in agitation have no intrinsic value, but derive those strong impressions they make upon the mind, wholly from custom, and thus warp it from its natural rectitude. But this does not fully solve the foregoing question. For if perfection be the only spring by which nature moves, the scope of all its pursuits and the means and end must correspond, we would fain know, that outward things manifestly preponderating, whether this force be resident in them, or that nature has not a competent strength to hold on in its true direction. This being a matter of general import, many elucidations of it have been attempted ;

tempted ; but none of them possibly have succeeded. And how should they, setting out upon erroneous hypotheses ?

§. 27.

Nothing is more unusual than to account that the natural condition of a thing, in which it is most generally found, and on this principle proceed most of the disquisitions on human nature. It is now many years since Polynices has given himself up to the most abandoned course of life ; yet owns, that collecting all his powers, he could stand his ground against all sensual blandishments ; but why deny himself gratifications which he finds so consentaneous to his nature, that it stimulates him to them. This situation, with Polynices, is entirely natural ; but, possibly, only because profligacy has eaten so deep into him, and that his conflicts, and reluctance, against the first
steps

steps towards vice, his subsequent agonies, at the first deflection from virtue, are worn out of his memory. Polynices, herein, is like a sick man, who, having never known himself otherwise, should imagine he enjoyed a perfect health. If in our judgment of ourselves, which is of such concern to us, we are so apt to be mistaken, how much more may we err in our sentiments of others !

§. 28.

Hobbes had learned from history, and actually saw that men mutually seek to raise their power by oppressing others ; to molest them in the quiet possession of their enjoyments ; and tear one another to pieces with the ferocity of wild beasts ; and, what's his conclusion ? that man has naturally no sense of good and evil, no consciousness of rectitude, predominantly actuated by enmity,

mity, rapine, and violence ; and all his proceedings are to be looked upon in that light. Machiavel, a true Hobbist, if ever there was one, labours utterly to stifle, in his prince, any remains of humanity ; and represents man as such an hideous monster of flagitiousness, that he has no right to complain of any measures, however oppressive or sanguinary. Holberg gives man better quarter : he exhibits mankind as rather objects of contempt than abhorrence ; saying, in his essay upon avarice, “ Several things
 “ are to be perceived in man, which
 “ can be accounted for only by suppo-
 “ sing him an ideot.”

§. 29.

Some circumstances, indeed, there are, wherein the malignity of man appears no less execrable than his imbecility pitiable ; but these, being only parti-
 cular

ticular junctures, as little can a system of morality, as a law of nature, or civil institutes, be built on them. Have externals no influence over the imagination and heart? what! not even in childhood? Behold a miserable creature resembling a man, speak, Is it not the saddest spectacle in nature? Without any deliberation, or reflections on its fate, it is resolved to give it a body; and with this body, intail on it diseases and perturbations. At his entrance upon the stage of this world, the little stranger falls a lamenting, and complaining, and with very just cause. As his sufferings continue, so do his complaints. The wise resource is to still them by aggravating the cause of them; and laying on him more than he can bear. It goes well, whilst one pain over-balances the other; and we are now possessed of the secret of making what we please of a child, without the trouble of deliberating on its right.

right. Is the first step of life so fraught with sorrows? the rest are of a piece; a series of injuries embittering his whole life, with only the poor comfort of revenging his sufferings on all about him; though he should set down quietly under all that is done to him, as intended solely for his good.

This history is continued in the sequel.

§. 30.

With some, the influence of external things is a point of so much certainty, that they rather allow it too great an amplitude, and even include the air and food.

These travel over countries, or, which they reckon equally authentic, turn over with a prying eye, travels and voyages to all countries; in order to acquire a knowledge of the sentiments and customs
of

of the several nations, according to their situation and climate, and particularly such as coincide with their own ways of thinking. The observations are arranged, and the accounts of writers of the best repute collected ; but where is the genius for digesting these precious materials into a regular system ? Can a man of letters be supposed deficient in genius ? no ; and to make sure work of it, he takes his compass and fixes it ; where ? where but in a country, blest with an exhilarating purity of air, and which the sun delights to cherish with its brightest rays. This is no other than his native country, and having drawn his circle, finds by the nicest measurements, and comparisons, that wit and taste regularly decrease, according to the progression from his centre ; but no, he adds a limitation, that his maxim may be general, and without exception ; which is, that if there be an equal decrease in the
good

good effects of the air and aliment; however there remains a comfort, for the countries whose misfortune it is to be very distant from that, which had the honour of giving him birth; that as to aliments, they may by commerce be supplied with them, from the lands of wit and sprightliness; but the air, the incommunicable air! I am inclined to think it was a slip of the pen in the elegant Cornelius Nepos, that the dulness of the Beotians, who were a standing jest among the Athenians, the most mercurial and ingenious people of Greece, was owing to the slender account they made of wit and delicacy of thinking, placing all merit in the sword, it is certain, that they were neighbours, and living in the same climate with the witty Athenians.

§. 31.

This difference is also manifest betwixt the inhabitants of the same country, breathing the same air, eating the same food, and using the same diet ; that to pore over travels, in order to know in what manner the soul exerts itself towards its perfection, is a very needless and injudicious labour. Our neighbour Stephen is a man of sound sense: his soul no less than that of a philosopher, is qualified to conceive of the world, according to the station of its body ; however, all its concern is about a piece of ground, and the tools necessary for its proper culture. These, and a few other ideas excepted, his soul has no other employment, than to put a lumpish body in motion. Give this soul the wit of a Bayle, the perspicuity of a Leibnitz, and the comprehensiveness of a Newton, what will these endow-

endowments advantage him ? a mighty matter, at most only to form a freighter furrow. There's Cleon, whose admirable talents would shine in another manner, did not narrow circumstances pin down his thoughts to a continual attention and sollicitude about the necessaries of life ; thus Cleon's rare accomplishments only give him a keener sense of his pressures ; remove them, and with half his capacity, he'll be more useful than he is at present. There's the little Cleobulus, what a hopeful child ! what scintillations of virtue ! yet a timidity sucked in with the milk, and fomented by harsh usage, destines him to a blind imitation of a very bad model ; will he ever thus make good the apparently well grounded hopes entertained of him ?

§. 32.

In short, the superiority in point of wit and taste, of one nation above another, is no more proper to it, than a good education is to a child, whose happiness it is to have a judicious and careful father. But may not the disparity of mental abilities be derived from various mixtures of the juices of the body, as is seen in a similar education. Let us hear a man, who by his chemical labours has acquired a profound insight into the methods, and processes of nature. Pancratus, that half-calcined adept, thus delivered himself in a numerous assembly. The structure of the body, even in its most minute parts, consists of vessels connected with the most exquisite art, to no science is it given so far to penetrate into the mysteries of nature, as from the modification of the parts of
the

the body, to determine the actings of men; but if impossibilities cannot tire out the curiosity of a chemist, shall it succumb under difficulties. Concealment is indeed a primary law of our science, yet shall I make no secret of a thing, of which, with its superlative utility, there's no appearance of my making any great matter, every one being so perfectly satisfied with his portion of understanding, as not to be desirous of any more; and consequently will turn their backs upon my scheme; but before I come to the exposition of it, let me mention a few circumstances which occasioned it.

§. 33.

I suppose none are ignorant, that the juices of the body are of different natures, and that from the proportion of the parts, and the opposite mixture of
them,

them, hilarity and sadness are derived. The four elements, which denote as many modes of mixtures in the juices of the body, have long since been adduced for explaining the various gradations of intellects. But the valuable discovery with which I have enriched this doctrine does not rest here ; it enables us to determine the degree of understanding, and to heighten and lower it at pleasure. I refer my experiment to your judgment, and will be responsible for its justness. A man, who was for making an extraordinary use of himself, and held this to be the most glorious, practised experiments on his body, and for this none could be fitter ; as what others perform by the assistance of a soul, he did without it, and, as may be said, of his own movement ; this, fame construed as a divine judgment, alledging there were instances of worse bodies having performed these wonders ; others, which is
most

most probable, judged that by an inverted abstraction he had separated himself from his soul, it being known by experience, that many separated themselves from the body ; be that as it will, I begun my experiment in this manner. Having taken five ounces of blood, I analysed them *secundum artem*, and on the most critical inspection found two parts of a very spirituous oil, two parts of a volatile salt, one part alcali, and one part earth. Here was reason sufficient, continued Pancratius, to estimate this proportion as the standard of a great soul, but in compliance with a friend, to whom my hypothesis seemed to exceed and who desired further convictions of the truth of this new discovery, I made a fresh experiment, and it was attended with the most desirable consequence.

§. 34.

This friend, one morning brought me some ounces of a blood, which he assured me to be of the best kind, challenged me, from my new invented standard, to determine the degree of intelligence in that spirit. Accordingly I betook myself to a methodical analysis of it; and there's no conceiving his astonishment, when, at the issue, I asked him whether the blood did not belong to that celebrated writer, whose novel doctrines made so much noise in the world? and whether his setting up to enlighten the world was not a direct consequence of the sanguineous proportions. So certain is it, continued Pancratius, that from some particulars in external deportment, of which the origin lies in the different nature of the blood, the degree of understanding, and the turn of disposition, may be inferred ;

ferred; else why is the *temperamentum sanguineo cholericum* accounted the noblest, and the *phlegmatico melancholicum* the very worst? from no other reason, than that the former comes the nearest to the indicated proportion of the terrene part, and the latter is the most distant from it. All blood, being derived from the aliments, partake of the nature of them; from a thick air and gross feeding, nothing is to be expected but a torpid blood, and lumpish faculties; whereas generous wines, and haut-gout dishes, afford juices productive of large quantities of the most refined vital spirits. Here Pancrätius ceased; every one was for pushing the point by multiplicity of questions, the most pertinent of which I thought were, why Greece, the, at present, ignoble Greece, antiently produced such great numbers of eminent personages? Is its air, are its esculents altered? Why are the ages of Augustus at Rome, and of Lewis XIV. in

in France, distinguished for wits? Had the wines of those times a peculiar excellence? But Pancratius cut them all short with this answer, Sir, are you a chemist? no, I know you are not; so don't be offended, if I pay no regard to any objections started against a science, by those who are strangers to it.

§. 35.

A cogitative machine is seen not to be so very inconceivable; it is only conceiving the disposition of the parts to be in all the perfection possible, and how many possibilities are not possible? and it is no new thing to imagine a body, which of itself shall, with the most punctual regularity, perform all the several actions of men. The nerves are impressed into motion by outward things; and this motion is communicated to the brain, from whence, according to

the necessities of the body it is distributed among its several parts. All that Pancratius does is totally to demolish the already tottering distinction of soul and body, the former appearing superfluous in his system; and do not we every day see the closest connections dissolved, upon one part of them ceasing to be necessary.

§. 36.

This doctrine is possibly not so very absurd, at least it procures us, and at a very cheap rate, the advantage of being a man, and a man of rank; it likewise loses nothing, by man's being considered in another point of view, as in the present essay, but will ever exhibit a just representation of the life of the bulk of mankind. Take the most flagitious of men, who basely foregoes the dignity of being a man, a creature of sublime destination,

destination, to free himself, as he imagines, from the restraints of a suitable behaviour, yet can he never so far debase himself, so far stifle the natural consciousness of his pre-eminence, that his amendment or depravation, though the former were not more facile than the latter, shall be utterly indifferent to him; and although his choice be wrong, his wish at least shall be just; is there then a certain sensation of what we can and must be, a sensation of our high destination? and does a right direction of the soul, consist in a constant and uniform conformity to this destination? Indisputably. Else how would mankind have been able, and under the prevalency of corruption, both intellectual and moral, to have made head against the incursions of ignorance and savageness? Or by what means could a degenerate race be reclaimed, unless nature had lent a hand towards the happy work.

§. 37.

And the history itself of those deplorable times of a general corruption, when yet a few noble souls, with unshaken firmness, trod all obstacles under foot; this history corroborates what every day presents us with instances of, that there is in human nature a certain force, by which it vigorously follows its direction; and this force constitutes the real greatness of man, and is the most illustrious character: this is an emanation from that tendency towards perfection, that general law of nature, by which all its parts, even from the lowest of the inanimate, to the noblest, the rational, are kept in motion and order. This tendency, without which the Creator's best schemes would, at the very commencement of them, be destroyed, and man, the chief of the visible creation, be a monstrous

monstrous creature, irreclaimable in his corruption. The idea of unity which is inseparable from an operative power, how manifold soever its operations may be, presupposes this; for the whole race of mankind constituting one whole, the parts of which have one essential direction and one destination grounded thereon; and again, every individual also making himself a whole, whose actings are likewise so many effects of power, like that which animates all and every part; thus the mental differences among men are to be accounted for no otherwise, than by admitting a different degree, or a different direction of this power. In the first case, our capacities would be only different, and not opposite, as they are frequently seen to be; thus the latter must take place, and we must either maintain that men are not all creatures of the same species, or grant that the unnatural direction visible in

some, is the effect of a preponderating opposition from without.

§. 38.

Every faculty of the soul, whatever its primordial strength was, must acquire, by frequent and vigorous use, that force by which it sustains the impressions of outward things. But the very use presupposes discernment, and a proper application of the powers, as the sole scope of these must be to keep the activity of the mind continually exercised in necessary occupations. Indeed, under a total stupor, in which we, at first, see an infant, his soul appears indeterminate, and adapted only to receive what images shall be offered to it; yet is not this a necessary consequence of that law of nature by which things must insensibly disengage themselves, and gradually emerge towards their perfection? And can a natural force be conceived without its appointed

appointed operation? Yes, but this direction is contrary to nature. If so, those actions which commence with the first pulsations of life, must proceed in this direction; the soul will thereby acquire a sinister force, the increase of which will be in proportion to the repetition of the acts, and our dispositions against it will always be too late. And, upon seriously considering the matter, What dispositions shall we make? We may account it our duty to collect all possible opposition against a direction of the soul, which shall appear to us unnatural. But all procedures in opposition to nature, are no less detrimental, and the natural consequences here will be the more palpable, according to the sensations excited by such detriments, and the weakness and impressibility of the mind, on which they operate. Thus is the remedy, and the only one practicable in this case, yet worse than the disease.

§. 39.

The soul, by its incarceration in the body, and the continual impressions thereby made on it, from outward things, finds itself so shackled in its tendency towards its natural direction, that it has need of all its strength, to retain a remembrance of its noble origin; and that all virtue should be accounted magnanimity, and all vice pusillanimity, as they actually are; the natural direction of the soul consisting in the former; the latter being unnatural. Indeed, in this point of light, the low scenes, wherein man appears to be made only for this world, prove nothing against his higher origin and destination; on the contrary, we rather see, that the world, to be adapted to his sublime character, totally to employ him, and to procure him the rank founded on his admirable faculties, must, like a play, have a few slender

slender parts ; and like a theatre, be of a large circumference. In short, this life, we see, is but the first part of a play, the intrigues whereof must be cleared up in the sequel, when, at the catastrophe, the perfection of the piece shall be found to have consisted in its apparent confusions.

§. 40.

This truth, which, in all respects, but particularly towards a better knowledge of mankind, is of the utmost importance, is never seen in its true light, but when we consider the faculties of a man, in the application of them, and their proportion to outward things, and their gain or loss by them ; for all the rhetorical flourishes, with which the excellence of man is set forth, without admitting this principle, being like some pictures, which are the less beautiful by being too fine.

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We now come to the great question, How to discover this momentous proportion? That outward things have a mighty ascendant over the mind, is but too evident; but of the mode and degree of the strength of the impression, we, as yet, are totally ignorant. And can we know them, who have so little knowledge of the faculties of the soul, and their exertions, for, do we, indeed, know them competently? Intelligence and volition, it is said, are the plain exhibitions of good and evil, and the rectitude of inferences grounded thereon;—all this sounds very prettily, but does not solve the question. For, if all superiority of genius, all the great qualities of the heart, to which we pay such veneration, are exertions or habits arising from use, they presuppose a prior origination, or certain strokes, as it were, of essay, by which a child, in whom we perceive them, is equally esteemable as the man
whom

whom he gives hopes of proving. Now the question is, What is this momentous origination? and what are the indications of it? What is judgment, liberty, probity, wit, resolution, nobleness of mind, and humanity, in a child? If the impressions of all these properties on the soul of a child, are but dark and faintly adumbrated, — Are they therefore undiscernable? If great men steadily adhere to the direction of their elevated souls, shall the imbecility of a young mind be such, that all his efforts are without any appointed direction? How then does it attain to such strength, if not by use; at first surmounting a slight opposition.

§. 41.

This, the unity of this great mark of divine agency, which, amidst such an astonishing diversity, reigns throughout all nature, presupposes, requiring that what
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is grand, exalted, and godlike, in the actions of men, in their maturity, should be delineated, by similar strokes, in the minutiae of a child of a high destination; this unity further requires, that all the actions of a man, as effects of one simple power, however different they may appear in the several vicissitudes of life, be yet originated only from the operative powers of the soul. As for an absolute illustration of the procedures of men, three souls must be called in; yet, shall we be never the nearer this unity. Lastly, the inconveniency has been seen, and this illustration has been imitated as well as it could be with one soul. This experiment shews us, at present, to have now only one soul; but a soul with its strong and weak side, with subordinate powers, alternately contending for empire, but without any or sufficient grounds; a simple essence, which has no parts, without parts, and yet has parts,

parts, in an incessant opposition to one another. Is this conceivable?

§. 42.

This idea is easily seen not to be seated in nature, but derived from men, among whom it is usual. Concerning the superior and inferior powers, it must be only said, that the several faculties of the soul, according to the influence of the destination of men, have a distinct worth; and, on that account, a distinct rank. And then the question is, Which faculty is so predominant as to determine the dignity of man? Rationality and liberty, we know, are man's privileges; but such privileges as meet with pretty near the same treatment as decayed nobility; some, from the mean condition which they find allotted to them, scarce ever bestow a thought on it; others, by reason of the appendages tacked to it, must
not

not claim it ; nor others revive, and bear it, meerly to gratify their vanity. But all men, as rational free creatures, shall universally enjoy this dignity, though in different degrees. Are not then rationality and freedom habits ? And must there not be those proportions in habits, as are seen in faculties ? And must not the rectitude of them be determined hereby ? Thus still a question remains, What are rationality and freedom in a child ? Or, what the faculties, by the use of which these habits vegetate ? This we fain would know ; and it is not only a point of moment, as all true education depends on it, but as including the foundation on which all just judgment of mankind must be built.

§. 43.

But, possibly, a child may be only a creature to which, out of fondness, we
give

give the name of man ; and whose nature, being perfectly indifferent to all outward things, must originally derive its direction and tendency from without. How shall we thus come at the knowledge of this faculty ? Must we not, in order thereto, form our judgment of a child from the bulk of mankind ? But this inference may be erroneous, being grounded on *postulata*, which have already been refuted. For men are either depraved, or, however, not what by their destination they can be. In both respects a child is different from a man. A child, however corrupt he is supposed, is not only much less so than a man ; but also more indifferent to all things than to those which pertain to his real destination. And though the inference were true, yet the question still remains undecided. For we will not acquiesce in an hypothetical consequence drawn from a similarity of some circumstances ; it is nothing

nothing less than one deduced from the very origin of the faculties, which will suffice. If children are to be estimated from men, in their present constitution, as well may we determine what men can be, from what they now are. But, to argue from children to men, is more rational and conclusive ; and possibly may be the only natural, consequently the best way to come at a true idea of men, as children by familiarly conversing with them become more known. In consideration of this advantage accruing to us, from familiarising ourselves with children, we might readily allow them the dignity of human nature, of which otherwise so little account is made. But no : their right, according to judgment and freedom, may be better grounded than that of a man.

§. 44.

We will suppose this plant, in which we cannot but hitherto admire the most perfect direction, and the means of fecundity formed in it by the wisest hand, in order to the accomplishment of the end of its existence ; we will suppose, I say, this plant to have at once received the faculty of distinguishing all the mutations relative to its external or internal state ; What advantage would this be to it ? None ; except partaking with us the satisfaction which is felt in being in such a state of perfection, where all changes are regulated by the laws of its nature ; as the disgust which we alone now feel at the sight of them in an unnatural state, for the most part, would concern them only. The laws of their nature would also thereby be so little subject to change, that every particular alteration
would

would be consentaneous thereto. But reason, if happily it obtain it, reason may possibly be of very eminent service to it. Reason! this would consist only in the knowledge which we have of the parts of a plant, of the nature of their connection; and how all its motions have resulted from thence. Reason likewise found the wisest constitution laid down for it; and laws not susceptible of any amendment; nothing being left for it to do, but carefully to keep in their track; but a reason like that of man, would it observe these limitations?

§. 45.

If it be true, that there is in nature any blind impulses, this is true of man alone. Throughout all the other parts of nature, this impulse is controuled by the wisest laws, and never known to transgress its boundaries. But man, the lord of the world, the head of the visible creation;

creation ; this man has the wretched prerogative of transgressing the laws prescribed to his exalted nature by the wisest hand ; the chimulations in him stifling all sense of guilt and punishment. Is not this a blind impulse ? And may not the impulse which animates the other parts of nature, be, on the contrary, called a divine impulse ? Can man have any rank, any pre-eminence in the order of visible things, when he has not a higher destination grounded on the direction of his nature ? And can he maintain this privilege ? or maintain it otherwise, than by living according to his exalted nature, and its laws. The noble members of a state distinguish themselves from the baser ; that the former pay a rational and voluntary obedience to the laws and institutions of the state ; but the latter only from a sense of being too weak for any successful opposition. The former account the welfare which they
enjoy

enjoy in this relation to the state, small as it may be, a part of the general welfare, which flows from the wise constitution of it, by any alteration of which they must always be losers; but the latter look upon the state as a contrivance calculated only to shackle their freedom, and fix them in wretchedness.

§. 46.

Nature is the state of the supreme Sovereign of the world, the perfection and felicity whereof, not only in respect of the whole, but of every individual, is the scope of his gracious plan; and is founded on the uniform observance of his institutions. In this state likewise there may be some members, who are admitted to the mysteries of it, and used for its higher offices. Some creatures may be placed in this pre-eminence, that by reason of their high station, their horizon
being

being enlarged, they may in a fuller view, admire that wisdom which governs all things by unexceptionable laws ; such creatures, such subjects, there may be in this divine state ; but even these have the stronger conviction of the obligation of that law, by which the welfare of the state, and of every member, is inseparably connected ; and the more are they penetrated with a reflective sense, that their reason consists in this view and conviction ; and their freedom in nobly resolving on a correspondent behaviour. Are these men or beings of a superior order ? Upon a view of all the various species of creatures, which swarm on this globe, they all, up to man, appear to act rationally, all conforming to the wise prescriptions of nature ; but these actions are necessary effects of the direction of their nature ; and a few compose the whole circle of their life, and the limits of their faculties. Let us now with these contrast man in his works, dispositions,

dispositions, schemes, and executions of them, many of which seem a kind of new creation. Such a variety of productions, and such sublime faculties, appear in him, as uncontrovertibly intitle him to the first rank in the visible creation.

§. 47.

But amidst all these sublime endowments, by which man appears destined to a much higher state than any thing this life offers; yet scarce is he seen to fulfil the duties of this life; a life so short in its duration, and where so little is required. Thus this life, which at first seems so much beneath him, seems to be exactly contrived for him; he seems almost actuated as necessarily as the creatures of inferior orders, custom giving the turn to all his manners and dealings; that, even in the most important junctures of life, he servilely adheres to it. His reason is a readiness, in certain actions
relative

relative rather to his station in civil society, than the rank he bears in the order of creation ; and his freedom is irrational, that is, to act in direct opposition to the laws of his nature. Is not man; thus, that noble creature, worthy of being the lord of the world, and of possessing all the appendages of that august title? He is, in respect of his sublime faculties ; but far otherwise, in his use and application of them. He disdains to lay to heart what he owes to his origin and destination ; and wants firmness and magnanimity to maintain the distinction of reason and freedom.

§. 48.

If we call in a more immediate revelation, as it would be an inexcusable neglect, or rather a stupid insensibility, to reject the light which it offers to us, and without which, in a point involved

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in such obscurity, nothing can be determined. If, particularly, we recur to that part of this revelation, which contains that illustrious economy, that economy so full of goodness and wisdom, laid down by the Father of mankind, for bringing back a degenerate race to that perfection, to which, by the wise disposition of their nature, they were destined ; these means, which are absolutely consonant to nature, give us a circumstantial knowledge of the corruption which has intervened. Such is the debasement into which man has fallen, that all sentiment of the exalted dignity of his nature, those divine remains, by the loss of which he forfeits the character of man, were in danger of being utterly extinguished amidst the ebullitions of vice, and the sophistry of reason, labouring to impose this on mankind as their natural state. Still, man, by this sentiment, although half stifled,
knew

knew that he was not what he could be, nor what he must be. This he either knew not, or wanted resolution to believe it. He knew there was no happiness for him short of perfection ; and this was unattainable without a model of perfection. Then appeared the Divine Redeemer in the world, and exhibited human nature in all the amiableness of its original perfection, in a lustre which struck the world with respect and admiration ; a model beyond amendment ; such as those who were not lost to all sense of humanity, could not but wish to imitate. He himself declares, that the end of his coming was to kindle the noble fire of a divine emulation ; that man henceforth should not entertain too abject thoughts of himself, but assume a behaviour becoming the image of the Deity.

§. 49.

Could the picture of glorious actions, and the statues of illustrious personages, in the porticoes of Athens, and the forum of Rome, excite in the minds of the Grecian and Roman youth, an ardour to approve themselves worthy of such ancestors and fellow-citizens ; statues and pictures, lifeless monuments, which could promote no more than a reputation limited to the territories of a city, and depending on the precarious and divided applause of a single people ; what may not be expected from a perfect and divine efficacy, which, for all actions truly great and worthy of a man, has erected a theatre in the center of the expanse, where innumerable globes display the magnificence of the creation, and which promises nothing less than the approbation of the Infinite. Read and be amazed.

I know

I know I speak to Christians. Read with what intrepidity, with what heroism, the primitive confessors, before so timorous and earthly minded, pressed forward on the new way, to true immortality grounded on their nature. Read, and pronounce, whether ever any doctrine was more elevated, or more suitable to human nature. Enthusiasm ! enthusiasm ! Hitherto I knew not that there was any thing in the soul, too vast to be circumscribed.

§. 50.

This elevated, this divine, principle in mankind, exhibits itself to the reflection, by august patterns ; in order, by it, to be convinced of what man owes to his parts and destination ; and, by imitation, emerges to the magnanimous resolution of not resting in any thing beneath what it is destined to ; this is the reason whereby we are men, this the freedom which makes us favourites of

heaven. O blessed beyond expression !
blessed ye children of Christians ! you
tread a theatre, where virtue, to re-
commend itself to your early years,
opens a succession of instructive and
ravishing scenes. Exult ; open your
heart ; never can it be put to a better
use ; open it to the impressions of the
fear of God, and the love of man,
of justice and gratitude, of tempe-
rance and magnanimity ; impressions
which point you out so many instances
of them in the men of true and distin-
guished merit. It is a mistake to think,
that those happy persons, with looks full
of complacency, are so without this me-
rit ; or that any but the worthless can
be unhappy. Every enjoyment of your
own flows from hence ; as from your de-
scend nothing so mean is expected,
which shall not deserve such things, and
even greater. See, to Orgon only is it
granted to live without merit ; and thus
from

from an inborn imbecility, he is incapable of higher sentiments. All other men, numerous as they are, have capacities beyond what their stations in this world, however critical or important, require. And this superiority is evident, it being in futurity that the immensurable field for which these noble endowments were properly designed, shall be opened to them. See, you cannot expect any posts, but such which the merits of the former possessors of them shew to have been too great for men without merit; and which, on that very account, will make you a standing ridicule. Don't imagine merit to be hereditary. The titles and insignia of dignities, with which the deserving have been invested, may be transmitted to you; but the shining merit to become them must be of your own acquirement; and this is no herculean labour. Dare only to cherish a sense of your duty to yourself, your ex-

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traction, and destination, and nobly resolve not to be less than they require of you.

§. 51.

The world, to our view of it, may be set off in an excessive advantage; and thus we have promised a child too much from his new habitation; but possibly a child may expect no less from a world made for him, and suited to his capacities. He may justly claim a better world, when, upon rising he shall perform more than is possible in a worse, and shall behave conformably to his destination. Be that as it will, it sufficiently justifies us in saying, that we are not for exposing the tender faculties of an infantine mind to the violent impressions of a depraved world, till strengthened by exercise, they are fit to grapple with opposition. Tell me now, Why are the limbs of a weak child

child wrapped up with so much care? Why are dangers apprehended from things which are nothing less than dangerous? Is it not because any slight collision or violence is sufficient to prove fatal to such a soft body? Now, think that from externals a tender mind is in a thousand times more danger. There's a child! the lovely creature! explain to me whence that melancholy, that pensiveness, in a countenance, naturally the seat of content and sprightliness. Is it possible that a child, formed for uninterrupted joy; a child, whose faculties must have manifested themselves, by that pleasure necessarily connected with every action arising from nature; a child, whose incessant activity, which is also of such necessity to the worthy application of his faculties, proceeds from delight, and, agreeably to the laws of nature, must, by delight, be kept in play; is it possible, I say, that, in such a child, there

should be any mark of dejection or solicitude, unless some violence, of what ever kind it may be, had been done to it? No; a melancholy child is a prodigy in nature.

§. 52.

But this serious air of a child may indicate a mind of a superior cast, and taken up with elevated contemplations. Whoever knows that attention is the first sign of, and the chief adjutament to understanding; whoever knows (and in these philosophic times who can be ignorant) that attention is a power of the soul, for distinguishing things, and developing the diversities in them; and that thereby we acquire ideas of every degree of perspicuity; whoever knows this, and compares this meditative turn of mind, will see great probability in the above-mentioned conjecture. But a little question remains,

remains, as yet not perfectly decided ; a question, the importance of which does not so much relate to adults, custom having obtained a strongly-marked ascendant in their actings, as to children, in whom only the springs of action are to be sought for in nature. This question, by which every thing, relative to a child, must be determined, and which must antecedently be discussed, is this : What is that in a child, by which attention, according to the gradations wherein it shews itself in a child, is to be noted ?

§. 53.

There are certain means, and these of such common practice, that nobody can be ignorant of them : I say, there are certain means for procuring, at pleasure, to all things, whatever their intrinsic nature may be, a value, and a consensaneous degree of attention. How else
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is it to be conceived, that men of the same nature, and same sensations grounded thereon, shall, in their manner of thinking and acting, so often, and so extremely, differ, not only from others, but from their very selves, had we not the power, by means of these motives, at pleasure, to impregnate their minds with any kind of ideas and conceptions. But these means I do not allow to be the best, as manifestly proceeding on an hypothesis, either that good and evil, true and false, perfect and imperfect, have no manner of foundation in nature, but are ideas merely arbitrary ; or that, if there be an essential difference in the things themselves, our sensations do not rightly correspond with it : both are contrary to experience. There is an external difference of things ; there is order, beauty, perfection, in the things around us, the nature whereof is such, that they bear a proportion to, and are infinitely connected

ned with, our station, in which, indeed, consists the entire worth of them in respect of us. Should we not labour under an essential defect, if only as creatures of a higher order, destined to maintain some pre-eminence in this world, we had not the perceptions for quickly entering into the real value of things? Would we not rather part with all other perceptions, if any such there be, than this? The case is too palpable to admit of hesitation; if any doubt of it, they must be such as carry the position of a sufficient reason too far, and who have the least cause so to do; or others requiring a proof which they cannot comprehend.

§. 54.

Thus the sensation likewise, by which we become passionately enamoured with goodness and perfection, by which every thing of this kind so strongly affects us;
this

this sensation is the ground of our appointment to attention, and especially of a child ; it having no other ground of destination. But this sensation is much too vivacious and active, and must be so, as the successful developement of the faculties, as we shall shew, chiefly depends on its agency, that a child should possess himself in the quiet and equanimity of a philosopher ; so that the pensiveness of a child cannot be attention, but rather dulness or stupefaction. It is upon this sensation that the whole genius of a child is formed ; and its natural parts most properly disclosed. Professor Gellartes, in the rostrum, maintained the character of a solid philosopher ; and so far as it consists in the appositeness of observations, and the strength of arguments, maintained it, even against the acute Tully. But when the point came to turn upon this happy sensation, refinement of thought, and delicacy of wit, a cloud overspread his glory ; he was embarrassed,

ed, he was baffled by a young woman, whom he had taken upon him to instruct.

§. 55.

But the affair is too weighty to be decided by this proof; for all that we have hitherto delivered, in general, of the natural direction of the power of the mind, and of the opposition of outward things, as well as of the principle of the faculties, and of the higher destinations of man grounded thereon; of the unextinguishable sense of the dignity of our nature, and of the pre-eminence of a child above any man, must now, in taking a nearer inspection of a child's faculties, be more precisely discussed, and placed in the clearest light. All the parts of a child's behaviour must, like the radiuses of a circle, unite in some certain faculty as their general center. This position, according to the face of things, may, among men, admit of exceptions; but

but, in a child, is of absolute and universal truth. On this principle we may, from the deportment of a child, examine the relation of the several parts, and fix the center wherein they coincide ; and thus will this faculty, which, by this means, is brought to light ; and on which rests, in a just proportion, whatever is discernible in the deportment of a child ; display the whole mental force, and determine the rank appertaining to man, in the visible creation. Further ; the fate, to which, among the infinite vicissitudes of life, this faculty is subject, will, at the same time, account for the fate of men, in respect of the various casts of their minds, and the low station, which, elevated as their destination is, they willingly embrace in this world. But if, in this disquisition, the taste, the happy sentiment by which, as we have said before, a child is, with so much justness, guided on in his attention, should be
found

found to be this very faculty, shall it then remain a doubt with us, that a child, void of our judgment, may act more judiciously than any man. Shall we question the rectitude and vigour of the efforts of his mental power towards his destination? Lastly, Must we not acknowledge, that the complacency with which all animate nature presses forward to its perfection, is also a law of the nature of a child?

§. 56.

All the faculties of a child, like the parts of a vegetable, when compacted in a seed, are quite undiscernible, till, by frequent use, they attain to a visible magnitude, which the latter derive from the confluence of nutritive juices; and these actings and exercises are sufficiently declarative of their future greatness; although only, as it were, the elements
and

and preparatives thereto. All the proceedings of a child flow from a desire of pleasing and imitating, curiosity, and an impatience after freedom ; and taste is the soul of these inclinations. Without taste, a child must be a stranger to that applause he strives after ; as without taste, he'll either make a wrong choice of a model for his imitation, or his imitation will be defective ; without taste, his curiosity will be either chimerical or desultory. And how, without taste, he should conceive a fondness for freedom, is a mystery indeed. This, in considering the views of these several propensities, will appear in a fuller light.

§. 57.

The desire of pleasing justly claims the precedence, being the source of all praise-worthy sentiments, and of all merit in general. 'Tis thinking too narrowly

rowly of a child, to imagine that our affection weighs no further with him, than as administering to his gratifications ; and that all the sensations he is susceptible of, are only such as the fruition of delectable things excites in him. No ; such is his tenderness, that soft tye by which he is connected with mankind, that he feels no contentment which is not derived from the affections of mankind. It is sufficient merit in a child, that it strives to merit. If a slender merit will gain our inclinations ; if we place no value on our affections, or rate them too high, or too low, this is by no means the child's fault. Whatever generous dispositions we perceive in a child, still must it not be forgot, that he is always for purchasing our affections at the cheapest rate possible. Depend upon it, that an experienced merchant cannot shew greater acuteness in his commercial measures, than the taste a child tastes in his estimate.

There's

There's little master Ascanius in his new cloaths ; ah ! cries the superannuated Berenice, all in raptures, how charmingly that suit becomes the dear angel ! why, he's a perfect prince ! and indeed a pearl of a child he is.—Such merit ! and with so little cost ! Compute the fond disquietudes, the anxious sedulity for his welfare, with the extravagant marks of applause, in all who have the care of him. All pure merit, without any cost of his ! But shall Ascanius, that tender and noble-minded child, give himself no concern about an affection on which he places a high value ? Yes ; but he'll first seek to procure it by the easiest means. And is not this sagacity ? He'll fawn and wheedle, and be profuse of his kisses and protestations, and even confirm them with tears, if these succeed ; but, God forbid ! for, should they, nothing further is to be expected from the best of children.

§. 58.

Now shew Ascanius every imaginable token of love and tendernefs, prevent his defires by all poffible attention, 'tis putting into his hands the fureft and the eafieft means, both to return thefe, and to continue poffeffed of them. Make no demands upon him ; all right on which fuch can be grounded, being on his fide. His worth would be perfectly determined, were it not for Clelia only, who has brought it into fome doubt. This lady, who, inftead of the delicacy of her fex, has the robuft limbs, and auftere countenance, and rugged difpofitions of a man, at firft fight of Ascanius, faluted him with fome command, or prohibition, and, without waiting an answer, inforces it with the boiftrous energy of a carman. Here Ascanius is thunderftuck ; and Clelia triumphs. But
shall

shall he therefore lose all spirit in support of a right so well grounded ? Shall he depart from his endeavours of ascertaining his worth beyond all doubt ? No ; from others he'll meet with less abruptness and contradiction ; their generosity and mildness, or their languor, being averse to such proceedings. And thus our Ascanius, by unbounded dissoluteness, will make himself amends for the restraint he suffered in the presence of the tyrannic Clelia. Ascanius, thus a compound of licentiousness and despair, fluctuating which course he shall take, now awaits his destiny from your hands, and fully resolved, whatever it be, to sit down under it. But whatever it be, towards his superiors he'll be pliant and servile ; and, towards his inferiors, imperious and acerb,

§. 59.

Never was seen a finer child than the little Horatio ; and the beauties of his mind still far surpass those of his body. This spark, who hitherto was happy in the finest education, under his father's eye ; now, within the limits of a public foundation, is to strengthen his little faculties, in order, on some future solemnity, to contend for the prize of learning. Horatio, says the father, I perceive, that the things with which you have hitherto rather amused, than employed yourself, do not find you sufficient exercise ; they are now likewise beneath your age. You are now big enough to sacrifice some gratifications, if it be to sacrifice any, to my hope of you ; but which I could not expect in your more tender years. Tomorrow you are to enter upon an employment, your proficiency in which will
shew

shew what can be made of you, and how you must be managed for the future. Horatio, full of those sentiments which a good son feels towards the best of fathers, and impatient to shew himself worthy of such a father, hastens, the next day, to that business which was to be the test of him. He comes, and comes with a firm resolution not to be discouraged at difficulties, and finds he has a great deal to go through; but, in two years, nothing keeps him sufficiently wholly employed. During two long years, all he has to do is to thumb certain writings, in which detached and incoherent words had been collected and distributed, for future use. How! during such a tedious space, has he only seen parts without a whole, without connection, scope or design? No; but he considers, and must consider them with an attention, which things of the most attractive and complete beauty, scarce deserve; I say,

say, which, had it the appearance of a whole, could as little affect him, as we would be by a history of the moon. Two years, surprising! yet all the chagrin, disgust and lassitude of two years did Horatio weather, animated by a generous and incessant fervour, to merit the affection of a judicious father. But what says the waspish Orbilius? no, Horatio is a milk-sop, he has not the spirit to make good his father's scheme of fitting him for some eminent station. He has had his head too much, and now, if it be not too late, a tight rein must be held over him. Whom, now, is the father to believe? he sees, indeed, that his little Horatio, instead of his former indifference to pastimes, is grown excessively addicted to them; he sees him now turn the deaf ear to words, which never failed to make the desired impression on him; in short, he sees him doing any thing rather than what he

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should

should do. This, thou seest, judicious Publius, and knowest, that a child must not be brought up to thy humour, but to the direction of the creator, the approbation of the world, and the advantage of the community; and further knowest, that upon the cessation of endeavours to be worthy of them, all these ends are frustrated. Publius, I pity thee most heartily! But may not the worth of that affection, in the attainment of which Horatio was so strenuous, have suffered from being set too high, and clogged with many onerous articles. May he not have a just regard for that affection, though unwilling to purchase it at any rate? yes, it is too manifest, that by requiring too much, or too little, of a child, we damp his propensity to please, and one or other will ever be the case, till we come at a better knowledge of children.

§. 60.

Should the dispositon to please be either darkened or extinguished, with it necessarily fails that propensity to imitation, by which both the mind and heart must be rightly formed to the most essential parts, to firmness, and that delicate sensation for discovering, by the first impression, whatever is great and noble. Take the most finished model, a model where art has admirably united every perfection; place this masterpiece before him, in the most advantageous point of view: yet, without that delicate sensation, all this will not be sufficient so much as to draw forth half his worth; nor is this all that is lost in a child, by depressing his inclination to please; but what is still of greater concern, his endeavours are likewise totally at a stand. For it must be no faint im-

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pression

pression of a noble model, to excite in the soul an emulation, and sense of its ability, by imitation, to acquire all the grandeur of the original. But admitting a child to be possessed of the justest taste, and the most generous ardour of deserving well of mankind, which formerly appeared in Ascanius and Horatio ; yet, to these faculties, at present so weak and tender, the practice of imitation, the only means of acquiring necessary force, is far from being a matter of ease ; for, let us suppose, as it is what every one will grant, that the best patterns are those of antiquity ; yet is a careful choice required, and afterwards a skill to place this perfect model in a position for making the greatest impression ; both which have their difficulties. Deity itself, adorable deity, is become but an indifferent model, since groveling geniusses have been permitted to depict the Supreme Being, and to introduce into their daubings,

ings, all those paltry strokes, by which even men of high characters would think themselves debased. Even the lustre of the divine glory, and the image of God's essence, affect us less at present; the representations of them exhibited to us wanting the necessary force, or a proper position. Would the bulk of mankind, who, in respect of their moral character, are by imitation what they are, be what they are; that is, wretched copies of more wretched originals, had they judgment to chuse their models, or were they placed in a just light?

§. 61.

That freakish volatility, which carries little Titus into so many excesses, is manifestly not grounded in his nature; but why does he thus over-act his vivacity? an old aunt of his, who has been conversant with children, entertained him,

besides others equally edifying, with stories of nocturnal apparitions, and witches, and with these are interspersed many curious narratives of children. “ Such a one, now so cried up, says she, “ was the wildest young rogue imaginable; neither words nor blows would do “ with him; he was always about some “ trick or other, and had a flirt at every “ body; then there’s Varius and Corne- “ lius, those two demi-gods, were not a “ whit better. We must wait for dis- “ cretion till the season, only let a few “ more years go over his head, and then “ see what he’ll prove.” Is it question- ed, whether this be the model on which Titus seeks to form himself. Ask him, or mind his carriage, if every particular stroke in it, to the very minutest, be not exactly copied. And how can it be questioned, when almost all the parts of the carriage of a child concenter in imitation; a disposition, which, of all others, acquires

acquires strength the soonest? How can it be questioned, when souls of the largest amplitude, in which the divine image is marked, with a peculiar strength, must receive their first motions from without, those motions which great examples impart to them. Really this is running into absurdities, when we make it a matter of doubt, that, after all possible discernment, accompanied with the most attentive sedulity in the education of a child, there should always be something more for him to require.

§. 62.

Curiosity, says Batteux, who understood nature so well, is the offspring of judgment, and the spur to science. This new comer, continues he, is too much concerned to be acquainted with his new habitation, that he should be so indifferent about a knowledge on which depends his good or ill fortune in this

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world,

world, as upon emerging from his infantine stupefaction, not immediately to give tokens of his longing after it; and an information, which he so passionately desires, is not to be withheld from him, and other lessons obtruded, to which he is averse, as not relating to him. Who can proceed thus and yet expect attention? I allow, said a child once, these are mighty learned things which are dictated to me, but I must not be learned; and yet scarce a word can be spoke, but this child shews the same eager curiosity as the most mercurial child; and, by his perpetual whys, and questions upon questions, declares himself impatient after that instructions, about which, at first, he seemed so indifferent. May not the torpid indifference of children for knowledge, which is every where so complained of, take its rise from our depriving things really new of the charms of novelty, and our ignorance
of

of dressing up in them such things where they are wanting. There is some appearance of it. It is the saying of an ingenious man; Would you know whether a child has learnt any thing to the purpose, permit him first to ask, or rather encourage his curiosity by the most precise and explicit answer, and by the air of complacency with which you deliver it; if this puts a period to his enquiries, his knowledge is sound; but if he does not ask before he has learned, whatever he may have learned, he knows nothing.

§. 63.

Freedom is the surest mark of a child's merit, and his sensibility can never exceed, be the danger with which he is threatened ever so small or remote. To be master of one's self, and of one's actions, is such an advantage that one cannot too early begin to be so; and unless begun early,

it will never be attained. In this respect a play is always a matter of greater moment, when 'tis a child's own project, than the most weighty affairs which may be imposed upon him. The necessity and reasonableness of obedience may be irrefragably proved both from divine and human laws ; and these proofs may be enforced by the comparisons of a ship without pilot, or compass ; or a traveller without a guide ; but much better were it, and it would more readily make its way to his heart, to let him see by our behaviour, that the power exercised over him is not arbitrary, and that it is not from humour we permit him one thing, and prohibit him another. A child, it is true, can learn nothing of greater concern, and the earlier the better, than to sacrifice his satisfactions to that of another. But to make it a merit, the determination must be voluntary, that is, have its origin in a sentiment of magnanimity
and

and tendernefs. But if this facrifice be extorted fimplv from hope or fear, abftracted from any other motive, is a child's ready compliance, from fuch principles, what is called obedience? then is an obedient child the very worft child, a child of the leaft hopes; and, on the contrary, this being the cafe, the moft pertinacious felf-willed child affords the higheft expectations.

§. 64.

Nor is obedience a blind fubjection, which we can claim as a duty, but a merit, and the merit of a noble difpofition, which, together with every other kind of merit, we fhould infill into a child; but which is not to be done but by leaving him to act freely, according to his fentiments. We feem to preclude a child from all manner of right to any claim; thus only his bodily fufenance,
to

to which all our care is usually confined, must be the effect of an unmerited bounty, a thought, than which nothing was ever more unnatural. We cannot be grounded in any demand on a child, as it is our part first to implant in him all the merit we can demand, and conciliate his esteem, love and confidence. On the other hand, when we consider his faculties, and his suitable destination, that is, his entire welfare, the great charge of our most sedulous care, how just and large are those demands! but from men, all whose dealings center in themselves, who are continually making demands, and allow of none, but such as they themselves make, can any other way of thinking be expected? A child displeases us, and we have never moved a finger towards moulding it into a pleasing cast; it displeases us, and the faults which offend us in him, are what we ourselves have ingrafted

ingrafted on him; but this escapes us, as we never bestow a single thought on education, till depravation has deeply struck its roots into the child. Deficient in those duties, with which we are acquainted, and these, from our incogitancy about the right of a child, make but a very inconsiderable part of them; how can we suppose that a child will love mankind, and with perfect contentment and confidence enter into that compact which puts his destiny into their hands. Yet is nothing less supposed, by inculcating to a child of a generous disposition, that obedience is a duty which he should feel. Is it then so evident, that we deserve this love and confidence? Is that mistrust, apparent in the obstinate self-will of a child, always without grounds? The art of education, says Batteux, is to close with a child's taste, as the finest part of the soul, and which is absolutely impatient of any coercion,

or

or make a shew of closing with it; even with the intention of checking it; all being lost, if he perceives the hand which holds the curb.

§. 65:

All the actings of a child, which we have hitherto considered, and which, aggregately, from the manifest influence of them, on the formation of the mind and heart, are of infinite moment; all these actings are easily seen to be either seated in the taste, or to be originated from, and supported by it. The taste likewise declares the original amplitude of the faculties, and the casualties to which, from his infancy, he is subject, imprint on him the characters by which men are diversified. Wit and judgment are at variance; the passions threaten the total subversion of liberty, and involve the soul in an intestine war; yet these
by

by taste are brought to a happy reconciliation, and that good understanding which distributes felicity, through the whole system of life. Further, taste is the sovereign faculty, to which, if faculties may be classed, the pre-eminence is incontestably due; all noble qualities, all real worth being purely emanations from the happy turn of this faculty. Taste is an universal quality, no situation is beyond its verge; in every circumstance it exerts itself, and with equal strength. Thus the taste in the orator, the poet, the actor, and painter, by which, with such energy they express grand and sublime sentiments, is not to be differenced from that which forms the amiable and august character of the man of virtue.

§. 66.

The performances of geniusses, indeed, are not always sure proofs of an elevated mind;

mind; but of this the reason is, that a capacity formed for all, is fettered to a single subject. It is out of all question, that for acting a grand part, that is, for exhibiting with a noble decorum, in attitude, voice and gesture, those sentiments which constitute an exalted character, they alone are fit, who naturally have the greatest share of fire, and in whom noble sentiments beat strongest; it cannot be doubted that he, who in the person of the magnanimous Scipio, has acquired such universal applause, could be able, even in his own person, to support such a reputation, if he did not think the part above his match. Callimachus has a most inimitable manner of thinking, all his conceptions are good and striking; but what he thinks, he thinks only in the person of Horace and Virgil; he quits the play-house, and loses himself among the populace. Is it also possible, with a well disposed and noble soul, to be mean,
or

or noble, only for a few hours? Further, can any one with an ability, happily to imitate the most unexceptionable models of what is amiable and great, with a complacency in their conversation, and a passionate love and admiration of such qualities, to form one's real character from the very worst models? Nothing more sure. An exalted character may be either accounted fictitious, and too abstracted for human nature, to be real; or the flame with which a man sets about his divine schemes, and by which he soon comes to forget his actual condition, requires too great a contention of mind for nature to hold out, without a voluntary supineness, for recovering its impulses. Whether this, or whatever else, be the origin of this strange phenomenon in the moral world, yet is it certain, that a good taste, by which we are taught a fine and noble manner of thinking, without
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that noble disposition, is something unnatural and contradictory.

§. 67.

For it will be supposed, that the faculty which instructs us in the judicious collection of the scattered strokes of beauty, so as, of them, to form a complete picture, need only be accompanied with some self-love, (which whoever is without is a *rarissima avis*); self-love, that is continually prompting to make ourselves of all possible importance, and to improve that importance to the best advantage; self-love, which will not allow us to be at peace with ourselves, till we have attained that importance. In this junction of self-love and taste, it will, I say, be supposed, that superiority of mind, and gratulation of heart, will reciprocally spring from each other. But vivacity
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and wit being too early accounted of more than goodness ; and the heart, though it does not entirely lose its right to delight, which yet it can no longer find in itself ; taste consists in the several means of quieting an uneasy heart. For, did men seek after truth, they would take the heart for guide ; a rational heart never neglecting essentials to coarse circumstances. Did they seek after real delights, they are only to be secured by the heart, in sensations of tenderness, magnanimity, gratitude, and philanthropy. “ It is an error, says a celebrated writer, to look for the motive of mens procedures out of the heart.” Inclination, in most, decides both what is true, and what is good. Of such importance is taste ; and so certain is it, that both the mind and heart are formed for and from it.

§. 68.

The sum of what can in general be said of a child, may possibly be reducible to this: This child is lively, that mopish; this heady, that discrete; but besides the great uncertainty of these marks, these qualities, in different children, are of a quite different nature, and as such require a different construction; they afford us no better insight into a child's faculties, and his destination grounded thereon, which yet are the principal things to be known, than does the temperament of his body. But we already know, that a child, by the universal law of nature, from the very first motions of life, is continually striving after that pre-eminence, for which a hand equally wise and good has destined him. We know that nature, inspired by a good proficiency and complacency, of
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which it is always productive, redoubles its efforts, and thus acquires an habitual strength, by which it perseveres in its direction with unshaken alacrity. Further, we are acquainted with the plan which nature is to carry to perfection; and with the means it uses for this momentous end. If we collect and arrange all that we know of a child, yet must those lineaments, by which we easily trace the character of a hopeful child, and are first enabled to form a right judgment of a child, spontaneously disclose themselves to our perception.

§. 69.

His curiosity, the curiosity of a child of great natural parts, must be ever under the guidance and support of that tender and happy sensation, that it may not, in any measure, mistake the center of the beauty and perfection of any thing.
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It must not acquiesce in any thing under the most apposite and precise answer; and particularly shew itself through an attention which must be neither above nor beneath what the matter deserves. His propensity to please must prompt him to endeavour after the praise and affection of all men; but, according to the impressions which a good or bad character makes on him, and without receding from his natural right. An over-rated affection, or which is but of little value, or which comes grudgingly, must be of small account with him. He must be penetrated with the pleasure of self-gratulation, which can never be whilst others are displeased with him, as this is never without cause. Further, among the various characters laid before him in their proper colours, and without the least intimation of preference, he must ever close with the best, select it for his model, without waiting for our recommendation,

mendation, and, by a careful imitation, form himself upon it. Lastly, nothing is he to hate so much as compulsion, and whatever intrenches upon the ease, simplicity, and spontaneity, of nature. His freedom, and chiefly the dignity of acting according to his own lights, and determining his views from thence, he must jealously assert, and never give up this right to another, unless the claim of such a person to his confidence be founded on the most genuine proofs of greater knowledge, and a disinterested affection.

§. 70.

A child of this character is universally allowed to promise a man of complete merit; a man eminent in the intellectual and moral qualities. As any of these lineaments may be wanting, so must there be some abatement in the hopes which
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are grounded on the perfect assemblage of them. But a little hope, more or less, might possibly be of no great detriment, under a sufficient certainty to see the completion of the hope, whatever it be, which a child gives of itself. For a child of this complexion is a plant, which, from its tenderness and generosity, being the more liable to be vitiated, requires the greater skill and sedulity. It is visible, that to one child of an extraordinary genius, who turns out well, there are an hundred of but very ordinary parts ; and this may be, that the latter are susceptible only of that cultivation which we have ability or skill, to give them. It is taste, which, by its several degrees, distinguishes the child's talents, and from whence the whole formation of the mind and heart receives its cast ; and never is this faculty more prejudiced than under a circumspect and solicitous education. Never is taste more shackled than amidst such extreme cares ;
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and that part of mankind about which the least care has been taken, has, in respect of taste, ever been the most fortunate. In the mean time, recollecting that the noblest faculties may be, and without acquiring by practice a force proof against pernicious impressions, must be actually depressed ; no care can be too great, nor can it be attended with any detriment, unless of an oppressive tendency, and to oppression, they are, otherwise, but too liable. The whole success of education turns upon the circumstances in which a child finds itself ; and these are always worse than a child expects ; that is, less agreeable to nature than they should be. We, on our side, do all which lies in our power ; and a great deal we do in sparing no pains, and leaving no stone unturned, to procure to a child happy circumstances ; and a child tops his part, when he does all that his circumstances will allow to be expected.

§. 71.

Our expectations are always too sanguine, as we are never sufficiently apprehensive from outward things ; and this want of apprehension may be owing to such a familiarity with the danger as prepossesses us against a right knowledge of it. Son, says a father anxious for the welfare of his only son, hitherto the object of his tenderest cares ; son, you are now entering upon a world, which, that I may precaution you against a too favourable idea of it, excludes probity and innocence from all right or claim to the advantages of life, or no further than accompanied with power or resolution to maintain them. The most unreasonable demands must be complied with, or we are devoted to resentment. The qualities which are of the greatest recommendation to the world, are an indifference about

about the natural rights of conscience ; a ductile complaisance, servilely moving according to the taste of the times, and of a patron ; a profligacy, procuring love at the expence of truth and virtue, and sacrificing both to profit. To be a machine is the first happiness in the world ; the second is, to be a villain. With the former, your good sense is incompatible ; and your careful education guards you against being the latter. Thus, at this hazardous step, which you are now upon taking, resolve, and it will save you the pangs of remorse ; nobly resolve upon being unfortunate, the victim of virtue.

§. 72.

This resolution, and without it the dignity of our nature is not to be supported, will cost the firmest man some conflicts. Advantage appears in such a resplendent habit, that it must be a strong

eye which is not dazzled, and even fascinated by it. Besides, is it a resolution to be required of a child? as to the necessity thereof, that is, incontrovertible, seeing that some meanesses are profitable, and some good qualities detrimental; yet still the point remains, whether such a resolution can be required? That we are to implant in a child merit of every kind, has already been suggested; and no more is to be insisted on from him, than he has received from us. Now, of all the effects in nature, none being more natural than that of advantage on the mind, warping it to that side where it shows itself; so, from a child, the only resolution to be expected is, that where he sees the most advantage, that way he'll take; and the only way of keeping him steady in the career, in which we would have him set out, is, to give it the most advantageous appearance possible.

§. 73.

From a defect in the formation of some of the parts of a natural body, or even if its whole formation be anomalous, we never impute such defects to an irregularity, or deficiency in the original design of nature. But say more rationally, that this deformity and imperfection in nature, is the effect of some external violence, distorting and embarrassing the modifications of nature. Tho' our knowledge of the soul be very superficial, so far we know, that it has a certain amplitude ; and that its faculties, like the parts of the body, have a reciprocal relation suitable to the destination of a man ; and a stated proportion, in which also consist the beauty and perfection thereof, as does the comeliness of the body in the symmetry of its parts. We likewise know, that the most noble souls,

souls of an aspiring activity, and indefatigable vigour, may be too little, and too meanly employed ; and that not only thus, but by other occupations of a similar tendency, some of the faculties may be degraded, and others raised to a height little suitable to their proportion and direction. Were it utterly improbable, that in the world of spirits, as in the world of bodies, there may be deformities and imperfections, and these caused by some kind of external violence, yet error and vice, are they not unnatural, and could they be so, if originated from the natural faculties ? Is it the first principle in education to follow nature ? If a right principle, let it take place in a child. But is nature originally depraved ? then the former must be directly inverted to traverse nature. According to the first maxim, all nature holds forth the best pattern for education ; but according to the latter, which makes of a child an

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exception to all nature, and a little of a piece with itself, we are not only at a total loss for patterns, but education is reduced to Hobbes's state of nature, a state of violence and oppression.

§. 74.

We shall here exhibit some customary plans of education, which may direct us in our judgment, whether in education, it is best to keep one's eye on the high destination of man, as the principal part of his nature ; or rather, to have a regard to the more immediate destination of a child, to some particular employment in the state of which he is a member, and to that scope direct all our endeavours. Many, if not the majority, will declare for the latter. The vicissitudes of human life, say they, are like the

intrigues of a comedy, or the catastrophes of tragedies ; and the part which every one is to act on this wide theatre, depends on birth, and his relation to the state in which that places him. And here, there is nothing for us to do ; or if we can do any thing, 'tis of little avail. The whole business of education is, to let a child learn his part by heart, and carefully to habituate him in it by the practice of it, in all situations, that he may act it with grace and propriety, when he comes to tread the stage of the public world. To fill his employment, it is further alledged, that the requisites are only capacity and diligence ; and enough of both these is quickly attainable by practice and attention. He who is a very valuable subject of a state, and expert in every branch of business, may be very short of the perfection of a man. A just system of behaviour is of more importance to a state, and its individuals,

duals, than fine-spun convictions; and to the former mechanical proceedings are not only sufficient, but more sure and certain. Hence the wise economy of a bee-hive, so much admired, and likewise every little member of it, the more machine-like it acts, the more exact, regular, and sure is it, in its workmanship.

§. 75.

This plan has certainly the recommendation of facility; and the execution of it bears no harder on the child than on his instructor. A child, for instance, is to be made a scholar; he learns by heart a multitude of words; their meaning he is not to trouble himself about. These, by certain rules, which have before been taught him, he is to connect; but that this connection shall express any sense, it matters not. Two weighty ad-

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vantages! Lastly, he is to answer intricate questions in all the sciences; and, by a series of conclusions, to demonstrate a proposition, without any necessity, (another inestimable advantage!) of his understanding the one or the other. It must be granted, that an easier way of learning to use another's parts nearly as well as one's own, there cannot be; and if we display parts, where's the matter whether they are our own, or borrowed? Nay, is it not manifest, that none are more sure in their measures than they who act upon the judgment of another? The objection, that this is but a mechanical way of proceeding, is of no weight here, as it is attended with this great advantage, that every faculty, which is capable of a mechanic art, can no longer be said to be unequal to literature. Besides the advantages of this plan, in thus easing a child in its endeavours, all the proceedings whereby the great end of learn-

learning may be attained, equally, as by ever so many well-chosen rules, are reduced to a small number, that a frequent repetition, which never fails of producing aptitude and readiness, must be both necessary and easy. And, in this easy manner, may be also instilled into a child the essence of good breeding, that is, elegancy ; this being made up of certain airs, attitudes, and words, which, by custom, as otherwise they would be only empty signs, have obtained a strong meaning. But not having used his thoughts in any business of weight, and the wisest men themselves not attending to it, let him, besides the benefit of repeating it often, and in the same manner, let him only be permitted not to think of it ; and hereby it will be manifest whether he is possessed of so much resignation, as to suffer this to be prescribed to him. But to what will not condescend such a timorous creature as a child, under the menaces of power ? Have we not an
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antient and well-founded right to make a child happy, even against his own will? accordingly let it be used and asserted with a high hand, and there's, at once, an end of all difficulties on the instructor's side.

§. 76.

Possibly, towards further facilitating the execution of this plan, it may be proper, in point of diligence and aptitude, to make considerable abatements to a child; for to the advantages of life, all which complexly are grounded on the affection of men, we have no further right than as we please them; and they are no otherwise to be pleased, than, whatever our worth and dignity may be, by totally forgetting ourselves, and, whatever they desire do, being just what they would have us to be. Nothing, however, is to be apprehended, their desires

desires are not very unreasonable. An air of complacency, an artful flattery, a graceful attitude, a reverential bow, things which cost us nothing, are specifics for conciliating the affections of men, and when lost to retrieve them ; an advantage greater than we are apt to imagine, all mankind being gainers by it. Thus education becomes a most facile business, and such it must be, not to miscarry in most cases. A generation, the chief concern of whose life is either by factitious ornaments to supply those graces which nature has denied, or to heighten those it has bestowed : a generation, which, in the contrivance and disposition of the various ornaments, the most current sign of worth, has carried taste to the highest pitch of delicacy ; which, in the delight of commanding, finds a solace against all chagrins, and whose mode of thinking generally quadrates with that which appears in children :

dren : now such a generation is perfectly adapted to this business, the business of happily modelling the taste of a child in the art of pleasing and insinuation ; that is, the art of living ; once an adept in this, he'll not fail to act his part well.

§. 77.

How ! is this all required to act one's part in the world to advantage ? but granting, that in future scenes we must personally act a part which corresponds with our nature, and its faculties now enlarged ; granting that we have such a quick sense of the perfection to which man must be destin'd, that upon counter-acting our destination, it excites in us violent emotions and passionate longings ; does not man stand in need of nothing more towards acting well his part in this world. Thus man is made only for this world, and by acting up to the duties of
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it, he may enjoy a sweet repose and satisfaction : his aptitude for it will also be greatly increased ; he'll not be unequal to the highest parts, and always equal to the lowest, if his natural gifts and real disposition be enlarged, rather than confined to one particular business, and estimated accordingly. The world is, indeed, a theatre, but a theatre subject to total and sudden mutations of its whole system, and by these mutations, all persons of but one part, to carry on the similitude, are mostly become useless : a theatre, where every part must exactly harmonise with the character of the actor, if decorum, the essential part of this propriety, and on which the whole success of the play depends, be strictly observed. Now imagine a man, whose knowledge, parts and sagacity are confined within one petty business, and who, if he offers to advance a step beyond that verge, bewilders himself ; a
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man without any other merit, and who will have none, but that of being a meer echo to others. Such are the persons of one part, and who cannot act even this part with proper decorum, it not being agreeable to the character of a man.

§. 78.

Is then that objection, and it is of very antient date, against learning, that nothing carries one further from sound judgment, generally groundless? Is it a frivolous objection, that artifice decorates our external deportment and appearance with so many graces and ornaments, only the more securely, under this seductive masquerade, to impose upon others? This nobody can say; why then do we meet with persons of such a cast?

Is there an undoubted connection betwixt understanding and virtue? how is it

it then that they, who, from the infinite proofs of it, in a long course of years, must have the strongest convictions of the happiness depending on this connection, make a breach in this union, and will not themselves be so happy, as, by their sincere endeavours, others are. The only answer to this is, that there are several parts not assigned by nature, but obtruded upon the actor, and wherein, as contrary to his genius, decorum will necessarily be wanting ; these are the effects of compulsion, by which the natural talents have been pinned down to a single business, opposite to their congenial disposition. A man might be too great for his post here, and yet discharge it well ; whereas he is now beneath it, and on that account miscarries in it. He would be capable of it were he what he now endeavours only to seem ; and if he were, might spare himself such endeavours. To know what he owes to himself, and
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his destination, is sufficient knowledge ; but these ~~are~~ parts for a more exalted theatre.

§. 79.

No, says the philosopher, these people are all heteroclites, having as little regulated their mode of thinking by sound logic, as their mode of acting by sound ethics. Man never acts aright, but when directing his behaviour by the evidences of an enlightened understanding ; that is, forms his judgment of proceedings from their universal consequences. A child, according to a new system, is no more capable of an evident knowledge than of a right judgment, but acts merely from the impressions of outward things, and the sensations which they excite in him. Agreeable and disagreeable sensations are, with a child, the distinctions of good and evil ; and consequently the
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only motives of his behaviour. And these motives, as so many just inferences, we must ingraft into his conduct, in order to create in him an early inclination to good, and an abhorrence of evil. For the illustration of this system, fear and hope are said to be the only sensations by which, as forcible impulses, mankind are put into motion, and actuated in their dealings ; and these, in order to make a child a worthy member of society, must, as soon as ever he becomes a proper subject of them, be kept up, and strengthened in him, by rewards and punishments.

§. 80.

This moralism, which judges of and distinguishes good and evil simply, from their consequences, is attended, in my opinion, with this single defect, that it is something low and relax ; too low for a man, much more for a christian. It
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makes man a mean interested creature, himself the center of all his proceedings, regardless of every duty, intent upon money, and carefully weighing every action in the scale of his sagacious idea of loss and gain. Probity, greatness of mind, humanity, generosity and tenderness, he turns the deaf ear to ; for every noble and humane action, every action becoming a man, may, and ever has been, in the consequences, as unfortunate as vice has been fortunate. And if fear and hope once get the ascendant, the wisdom resulting from thence will be, come what will of humanity, to espouse that party where there's the least to fear, and the most to hope. Virtue will carry no further recommendation than from the advantage it can offer ; and when vice outbids it, this wisdom must stand excused, if it closes with the choice so much *a la mode*. But were this wisdom the offspring of hope
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and fear, supported and directed by a sufficient information of the real value of things, would the party which it espouses be then not only the safest, but always the best ? Yes, but let not him who is to acquiesce in such information, ever be suffered to appear in the great world ; for a few steps will persuade him that the worst misfortune which can befall a man is the loss of some small lucre, some trivial honour, or sensual gratification, as the greatest felicity consists in the fruition of them. Now, examples being of another force in instruction than precepts, it is easily seen to what choice a wisdom, under the influence of fear and hope, would incline.

§. 81.

The choice is determined ; and it is known what is to be feared and hoped ; and though, here, the objects of fear
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and hope are meer phantoms, yet will judgment, with all its engines, be wholly taken up with the means of getting possession of them, and maintaining this visionary felicity. Such is the error of mankind, in the most essential point, the choice of good and evil. But may not this error be caused by a want of the intelligence necessary to judge aright in this matter? No, nothing is more evident, than that man errs contrary to the fullest knowledge, and errs because the error is a pleasure to him. When was a miser, a sensualist, an ambitious person, ever known to want sagacity? Has not their address in compassing their ends always been admired? That the heart is made for sensation must be granted; and it feels, upon the first motion, a desire of sustenance; and man is susceptible of no delight, no happiness, but what arises from the sensations of the heart; all other things, which are not connected with, or relative to them, are
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without his sphere, and do not in the least affect him. Now if hope be the sole sensation which engrosses the soul, by which it confides in itself, and is animated and guided in its measures and views; yet can it not be so any further than as promising the continuance and increase of the present pleasure. Thus is it pleasure by which, from infancy, the heart models itself, and partly acquires that strength, that manly strength, by which it sets all reasoning at defiance, and which is the subject of the first and capital pleasure. Pleasure corroborates that inclination which lords it over man with all his knowledge and penetration.

§. 82.

Say, upon what probable grounds is it to be expected, that the avaricious, the voluptuous and ambitious, shall sacrifice these their predominant bents to
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any proofs, however cogent of the emptiness of those apparent goods which they are so eagerly coursing? You require them to forego their pleasure, and possibly the only pleasure which they are now capable of feeling, and for what equivalent? — Is it not pleasure to gain the plaudet of the Infinite; to be conscious of generous endeavours; to be acquainted with the dignity of our nature; and to live to the honour of our Creator? Is it no pleasure in the divine state to be a favourite of the King of kings? Is it not pleasure to promote the well-being of our fellow-creatures, who have the same right, and are under the same laws as ourselves? Are not benevolence, tenderness, magnanimity, probity, and gratitude, the most delightful sentiments of human nature? Certainly these are extatic pleasures, distinguishing of human nature; but which have no relation to a man who lives only to hope and fear;

to a man who places his chief good in his sensations, as when fear and hope unite in one object, himself having no feeling or sympathy for any else. For such a person, supposing him reclaimed from his error, and the pleasure grounded on it, being of such a cast, and having been perpetually busied, frightened at a tremendous vacuity, would sink into a lethargic inactivity. Far more generous and noble sentiments than hope and fear, sentiments productive of more praise-worthy motives, appertain to human nature. They only incline men to what is profitable, and may contribute to mend his condition; but were man without any sense of what is decent, amiable, generous, and great, the brute, which, by a natural *εὐπρην*, sacrifices himself for his young, is a far more noble creature than a man with all his parts and sagacity, and a groveling selfish soul.

§. 83.

Man's error, in the choice of good and evil, is by no means natural to him, and least of all to a child ; sensation never erring so much and often as reason. It is well known that a child, and all who learn to speak as children, are very incorrect, both in expression and sense ; but will it from thence be inferred, that to talk and think amiss, is natural to them ? No ; it being no less known, that to speak and think justly is much easier than otherwise ; every thing in a perfect discourse agreeing better with a few general grounds, than in one that is faulty. Nobody will affirm, that without a consummate acquaintance in the rules of poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture, there is no judging of what is beautiful ; or feeling any high pleasure from a finished piece of those
arts.

arts. May not the same unity and diversity, the same just proportion and symmetry, reign in a moral character ; and may not these qualities, by means of a happy sentiment, impress delight on the soul ? Let the trial be made ; let several well-drawn characters be laid before a child, and the justness of his taste in distinguishing what's beautiful will raise admiration.

§. 84.

However we may admire the justness with which, in respect of the body, nature guides a child ; under a stupefaction, and almost an utter debility, he uses the several parts of his mouth for attracting and swallowing this first aliment, with a justness and dexterity beyond any instruction of art. He walks, and by some accident his little tottering body loses its equilibrium, see, he is not

only immediately sensible of it ; but by means of the same wise nature, can recover his posture, and prevent a fall ; or, if yet too weak, stretches out his arms to save himself, or lessen the hurt. Let this child be instructed in all the depths of mathematics, in all the observations and experiments of physics ; will he proceed with more justness and certitude than before ? Thus, either nature must have limited its whole concern to the body, this being, possibly, that part of the man most intitled to its attention, or it must, with equal justness, direct the soul by sensation.

§. 85.

Neither is there any necessity of instructing a child in the choice and distinction of good and evil by ascetic means ; and either all our penetration is of no use to him, or if it be, he'll come
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to it of himself. The impressions of outward things do not determine the behaviour of a child ; but are only occasions of forming himself according to the plan laid in him by nature. An animal, for instance, a bee, acts with a justness and accuracy that nothing can surpass. It is not denied, that they have certain conceptions of outward things ; these operating in the same manner on the organs of the senses, with which they are furnished, equally with ourselves ; however, who will maintain, that the alterations and movements we remark in them, follow from any other laws than those of the direction arising from their nature. This indeed evidences man's pre-eminence, that he can act upon clearer insight, and in most circumstances, and especially of any weight, has a consciousness of the plan which he is to execute, and of the means by which he conducts it. But this is a pre-eminence which we neither

can or need allow him, but as a higher degree of readiness, to which, by the frequent repetitions of particular actions, he is become habituated. However slightly the degree of clearness in a child's conceptions may be thought of, it is not affected thereby; since, in the execution of his plan, it enables him to proceed with perfect propriety, and must, that the advancement to higher degrees may be in a just proportion to the lowest degree; nature never acting *per saltum*.

§. 86.

Man is created rather for action than speculation; and, as a proper behaviour ever shews the rectitude of his thoughts, no less do vicious manners declare the error or depravity of them. This especially holds of a child. If once a corrupt bent has taken root in him, it is surprising with what artful versatility he strikes

strikes out methods for the gratification of it. Oh! says he with an heroic air, a child who has happened to cut his finger, I, who am destined to such a weighty post, must not mind these trifles. Yet, let this child be seized with the head-ach, he droops, throws aside all business, and runs to play. Why do his magnanimous thoughts fail him here, where the consequences shew the pain not to be greater than the former? Why, the drift of his dissembled firmness, under the first pain, was to avoid a reproach he was afraid of; and his complaints and dejection under the last, mean no more than to get rid of business, which he does not like so well as play. Now this little man, for so he must soon be called, the man already beginning to show itself in his conduct; this little man, I say, has he no sagacity? No; that can't be said; yet does he err? Yes; and from the very same cause that all men err in

respect of good and evil, being a gainer by error ; whereas by truth he would be a loser. Sagacity, however great, never ameliorates a depraved heart, but rather inflames the distemper. On the contrary, a good heart is never wanting in the truths necessary towards a happy life, as from that treasure all the adjunctments of a practical knowledge must emanate.

§. 87.

Possibly also the idea generally entertained of these clear ideas, and which are said to be even in children, is itself not so much as clear. We are said to have a clear idea of a thing, when we are able to repeat after another, all the properties belonging to, or contained in it. Now it is very possible to repeat, with the most ready fluency, all the particulars of an idea ; for instance, of a mill, without actually having a clear idea of it ;
whereas

whereas another, ignorant of the names of the several parts of this machine, shall make a draught of it ; and consequently, must have a complete idea of it. The mass of mankind, whom we term the commonalty, have very just and clear ideas of all things, in which they don't stand in need of our instruction ; but by the want of expression, their ideas, tho' perfectly just, appear defectuous. Others, on the contrary, whose memory, from their infancy, has been used to retention, their faithful tutor, according to the expression of a celebrated writer, having laboured to instill into them their own opinions, may have words at will, tho' without ideas. And this is also applicable to children ; for, with all their pains to enlarge their scanty speech, they seldom are so happy as to learn more than the common words ; and so from their inadequate expression, it is inferred, that their conceptions are false and im-

perfect. This is a double injury; a failing which ought, and easily might, be amended, is neglected, and then charged upon the child.

§. 88.

Did we bestow on a child but half the care and attention which we do not grudge to other works of nature, much less deserving of it, a multitude of just ideas would appear amidst all the flaws of expression, and noble inclinations amidst imperfect words. Yet this holds good even in a child; think or not think, no heed is given to it; yet is a child's mode of thinking concluded from his expressions, just as though his speech were innate, and not learned from those who are about him, or with whom he first converses. These not being generally of the best sort, neither is his speech; for who concerns himself? Yet it deserves
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concern, to correct his manner of speaking, and of thinking, which depends thereon. Who concerns himself to unravel the thoughts which a child would express, but which by the defectuous expressions are quite unintelligible ; and to form his speech to that grace and propriety necessary to an advantageous delivery of his thoughts ? The proficiency and pleasure which, upon trial, will appear in a child, may convince us, that it is no more than a kind office which he expected of us. In the second part this shall be shewn to be the only method for training up a child to a clear knowledge. In doing so little justice to a child, we must have no sense of the trouble which we ourselves are put to, in excogitating fit expressions to cloath our thoughts in, or of our chagrine at any severe criticism on our thoughts, merely from some flaw in the diction. Indeed a child, by obstinacy and contradiction,
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takes his revenge for this injury, and not without reason. Browbeat him, and he'll turn out a blockhead ; and then you have a home proof that children are to be better thought of.

§. 89.

According to the two objections, on which we have made a few cursory observations, but which shall be more fully examined in the sequel, a child is not duly kept under, or not in a manner suitable to his nature ; and thus, if not the very reverse, yet much less than is expected from his nature, will ensue. But how to execute a plan, which, how little analogy soever it has with nature, has met with no small approbation ; for, though hundreds, with no other argument than custom, confidently proceed upon it ; yet must it be from its connection with other principles, that the inventor alighted upon it.

it. The first which occurred to him was, doubtless, the clear conception of a child. A child, thought he, is a creature whose essence consists in a *possible humanity*, which, by an arbitrary junction of intermediate causes, is in different manners brought to effect. Yet is this too vague — Real men are either machines, dependant, both as to their thoughts and actions, on external directions ; or prodigies of cogitations and propensities, under their own direction ; but being so, are perpetually counter-acting the direction of a man. Now a child, being in little what an adult is in great, he is either a machine or a prodigy. What follows from hence ? That a child is born, either to obey or command. In the first case, all imaginable means must be used to keep him in strict subjection ; in the latter case, he may have a tinge of vice, but he must be accustomed to a delicacy in it, and to season it with taste
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and address. This is the appearance of the moral world. Such were the inferences of former times; and by inferences the system of the material world came to be made known. The world was said to be a plane, environed with water, having two ends, which are the extremities of a straight line. The sun, in its semicircular course over this world, rises at one end, sets at the other; thus diffusing light and heat all over the subjacent plane. Two ends — a semicircle — a sun only to run to and fro in a semicircle — What is more natural than that the earth, and the sun's track, should together form an exact semicircle; and that the whole compass of the creation should be included therein? Is thus a child wholly destined to obey or command? the destination of men to rise, and after a short course to set? But men are instructed in religion; yes
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in religion, that is, a training up to the destination grounded in our nature, must be the whole of education; or religion is only something pertaining to another life, and which in this we may dispense with.

§. 90.

That a philosopher should be mistaken in a child, is excusable, being too much taken up with the doctrine of happiness to stoop to such a matter; but his excessive confidence in his conclusions concerning men, of which he is one, concerning human nature and a child, does not deserve the like indulgence. A child, like wax, is mouldable into any imagery, at the pleasure of a hand, which it is not able to resist. A child undergoes innumerable violences, even when our endeavours spring from the
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best intention ; and suffers no less when we neglect him, and leave him to the impression of outward things ; yet, when arrived to the state of manhood, he is only that in great, which, when a child, he was in little. If this inference be just, as well may a child be placed in the most unnatural state, and turned among the beasts, (more children than one having met with a tenderness from beasts which man had denied them) and if then no trace of reason and conscience, no mark of humanity, be discernible in him, you may infer, and the inference will not deceive you, that reason and conscience are no privileges of human nature, but only implanted in us by the kindness of other people. Among Christians, indeed, a child can be no loser ; a Christian, with a knowledge of his duty, making it his care, his joy to discharge it ; tho' under

under no oath, or civil obligation, to serve the public is his element. He kindles at every opportunity of benevolence, and bleeds at the distress of another. The royal precept of loving one's neighbour as one's self, he fulfils in all its comprehensive amplitude. In him a depressed genius finds a wise and liberal patron, who, besides his attractive example, employs every mean for ingrafting on it the whole effulgent set of virtues. But I pity the little Indians, who, as dead weights upon their family, too early meet with matter of discontent, when their fathers have had no luck in hunting and fishing. Greatly to be pitied are those poor little Indians, whose parents, instead of the gentle intimations of a judicious morality, or a tender conscience, are swayed by wild passions. How shall they be impregnated with felicitating sentiments of humanity?

manity? Or what can prevent their being depressed at the first dawnings of sensation.

§. 91.

But this pity must surely first strongly affect us in a retrospect on the condition of our progenitors, in the horrible state of an universal darkness, with all the terrors naturally accompanying barbarism. A country of no large extent was divided into an hundred small states, without any other relation to each other than their proximity; the prosperity of each of these detached states consisting in a sufficiency of provisions, could not be lasting, the constitution of them being supported neither by wisdom nor equity in the members. Unavoidable and capital injuries, for which, as no satisfaction could or would be given, the injured party avenged

venge itself, inflamed two contiguous states with the most violent enmity, which broke out into mutual slaughter and desolation. The sanguinary monuments of battles, defeats, and ravages; the narratives of cruelties, mixed with the most tremendous execrations; the songs where rage and barbarity are extolled as the most exalted heroism; these early fill the minds of children with savage ideas, which, fomented by the bloody sports of the field, and inspirited by the applauses of the people, at last rise to a kind of frenzy. Humanity among beasts were a sensation, not only useless but troublesome; without stifling this there's no acquiring, preferably to others, the great and only truly noble privilege of despising a life, which was seen to be in continual danger, and of selling it as dear as possible. Such is the representation given us in the most authentic accounts of the state
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of communities in their infancy, in the times of universal ignorance. What is this? Are such men only in great, what when children they were in little? Let us hear more of their history.

§. 92.

From such manners of the nations, the Romans, those conquerors of the world, being apprehensive that their conquests stood on an unstable bottom, prudently used all possible endeavours to mould them into more sociable dispositions. They even settled among them; whereby a country, which scarce afforded a coarse and scanty subsistence to its inhabitants, in a short time yielded, even to exuberance, all the wholesome and delicious products of the field, the garden, and vineyard. Skill and diligence, for which the soil seemed to have reserved all its treasures; and these of so
much

much importance to the conveniency and delight of life, from being wondered at, came into vogue. The Barbarians grew in love with a life abounding in advantages, to which they had been strangers, and attended with a security beyond their imagination. Pleasure made way in their hearts for the sentiments of friendship and society ; and they became men. Thus Paradise was opened in the wild. The impetuous ebullitions of raging passions subsided, and gave way to the moderation and gentleness of a civilized nation. In short, from the improvement of their situation, monsters, who delighted in blood, became men, who cannot be happy but by making others so.

Would it have been possible, by such slender means, to have reclaimed a savage people to a social benevolent spirit, were not humanity deeply impressed on them ? Had this been possible,

ble, under such an universal combination to suppress, to extinguish these precious remains of divinity in them; had not their nature been strongly impregnated with humane sentiments; must it not be granted, that these men now, first, after being more and more alienated from the atrocious usages of unnatural impulses, first began to be in great, what they had been in little; but by an unsurmountable opposition, had ceased to be? But this was only a beginning: that divine doctrine, the doctrine of the destination of man, their wild hearts being thus prepared for its reception, shall now carry the grand work of the reformation of mankind to its perfect completion. This doctrine represents to them, that the whole world is one community, under God, Creator and Sovereign, who loves every subject with equal tenderness, and has destined them all to equal happiness. It is not, however, his pleasure,

sure, that this happiness should be, as among inferior creatures, a necessary consequence of the direction of their nature ; but that it should be merited, the acquirement of continued endeavours, and in gradations answerable to them. No sooner is the moral improvement of man at a stand, than depravation takes place. When he relaxes from his aspiration to a resemblance of Deity, he sinks into brute, of which there have been, and are instances, in whole nations, as standing monuments of this great doctrine. All the happiness of which a man was capable, consisted in the sense of the amelioration of his nature, and its restitution to its original rectitude, which was susceptible of a continual increase, even to eternity ; man being appointed for eternity.—Besides that nature, maugre all the cavils of wit, proclaims this doctrine, is proved by those divine men who explained it in a
manner

manner beyond all doubt. Their lives and deaths manifest what great losers they should be, if it were false ; and how great stress they laid on the truth thereof. Thus a Christian, previously to his being such, must be a man, a Christian being a perfect man ; and Christianity consists in those divine aids which it offers to nature, for its steady and vigorous progress towards its destination. In short, Christianity is the best education.

§. 93.

But it must not be forgot, that the world is a stage, where the vicious pieces have a much stronger and worse effect on the mind, and especially a juvenile mind, than the theatrical drama's. For there vice is decorated with adventitious beauties ; and virtue, disfigured by grotesque strokes. Prosperity is made the
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constant attendant of the former, and calamity of the latter. We are, indeed, deceived ; but the deception lasts no longer than whilst we don't recollect that we are on a stage where the laws of truth are not strictly kept to. In the scene of the world it is quite the reverse. The actors are, as it were, our patterns ; to which the advantages and applause with which they act their parts, strongly recommend them ; and patterns whom, with all their faults, even to that of the voice, we imitate. On these faults custom stamps the mark of beauty ; and we come to cherish them, as part of ourselves. A natural consequence of which is, that man, to whom Deity was set as a pattern, and who had a strong inward consciousness of his sufficiency for it, must yet become a bad copy of worse originals.

The End of the First Part.



THEORY OF Mankind *and* Education.

PART II.

*Of the particular nature of a child;
also the sequel of the history of a
child.*

§. 94.



A N, according to the primitive history of him, was first a statue, then a machine, and lastly a man; and still, to be a man formed for this world, a man
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worthy of a higher hope, he must go through the like changes, and almost in the same gradations. Here's a quiet race, a whole state of silk-worms, who being an emblem of the immortality of man, and still more of his life, deserve a closer inspection. Now they, one and all, by means of insatiable voracity, are labouring to increase the little bodies to the utmost, and, by degrees, to disengage themselves from the confinement of their involucrum; this low desire of amplitude engrosses all their endeavours, and is universal, no difference at first being seen among them; but soon there appears a very declared difference. Some upon, and even before compassing this first end, for which they were labourers so hard, discontinue their efforts; and, as if they had fulfilled the end of their being, they again withdraw into the darkness of that tegument, which they had hardly got out of. Others, who
seem

seem worms of greater parts, above resting in the execution of their first design, make preparatives for some mighty work, set about it, promise something great, and expire. Others, animated with still nobler impulses, carry their subsequent works to perfection, and after having, through a series of metamorphoses, and various spheres of action, fulfilled the whole plan of their nature, by means connected with it, like persons who have performed their parts well, quietly retire from the stage, to make room for others.—What is the old man, over whose head eighty years have passed, and all whose insignificant life may be summed up in this short line :

He lived, and married, and died.

What is he more than a worm dying in its first transformation? The more aspiring man, who labours to immorta-

lize himself in this world, and in the midst of his pursuits is taken off, may he not be compared to the spider, which, influted with its skill, says, I spin for eternity ! but it has scarce laid the foundation-web of its arrogant scheme, when the quick-sighted maid, with the broom, demolishes both the weak structure and the presumptuous architect.

Alcestes alone is found to think and act like a man ; the following was one of his noble soliloquies : “ Rise, my
“ soul, above worldly fruitions ; let
“ life be so ordered, as to end in a chear-
“ ful death. God, whose goodness is
“ over all his works, will not with-hold
“ from me what is really necessary. Be
“ it my constant care to walk worthy of
“ him, in all virtue ; may I be ever on
“ the wing towards the inconceivable
“ felicity of his presence.”

§. 95.

This is the summary of what has been laid down in the first part, where the sublime faculties of man are sometimes considered as indications of his higher destination, and as means whereby man maintains that elevated rank in the visible creation, which is the unquestionable appendage of his nature: but the best faculties, as we have likewise observed, may be depressed or misapplied, both by being sufficiently employed, or in a manner discordant with the nature of them; so that the whole in education depends on practice, and the proper choice and method of those occupations which are to be the subjects of it. From what others were, and how they became so, we know what children may be, and how they may be such: but besides that no man is what

from the principle of his faculties he might have been, the verisimilitude on which his knowledge of this is grounded is so very precarious, and even the contrary may happen, there not being two cases in the world perfectly alike: this, and the great maxim of the wise, *follow nature*, lays us under the strictest obligation to insinuate ourselves into the most intimate acquaintance with a child, in order to a clear insight into this nature of any child; for which we are at present to chuse the necessary occupations, as on this insight depends both the rectitude of the choice, and the success of his education. It appears, indeed, that to a happy choice, nothing further is necessary, than to try him by variety of things, with which children may be amused, and carefully observe where appears the greatest proficiency, or the least opposition; but there are certain customs, if they are not all such, which
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are caused by, or more immediately proceed from nature itself; according to which, all that a child expects from us consists only in an assistance, which will be very defectuous whilst we are unacquainted with his nature.

§. 96.

A child nevertheless well deserves our attentive observation, by reason that something great may be expected, as that which contains the grounds of greatness can never be mean.

The first movements of a child, which are always looked upon as insignificant, and rather matter of diversion and laughter, than of observation and judgment, to which they have the best claim, the first actions being those by which its high destination is set in a clear light; such are the prattlings of a child endeavouring to imitate what he

has heard. That a child has an idea of a sound, and of its signification, and can, on a similar occasion, recollect such idea, is so far from being a pre-eminence, that creatures of the lowest order equally partake of it with him ; but this is also one of the most inconsiderable of the actions in question. The principal, and that by which a child essentially distinguishes itself, is this ; he tries a sound in which possibly there is no resemblance to any other, except, which is an effect of all, that the air is agitated thereby ; at length, by frequent repetitions, he comes to form a sound, something nearer one which he had heard before, and retained : immediately, by means of a higher power of the soul, he proposes to himself one of these ideas as a pattern of his imitative faculty in forming others.

§. 97.

A two-fold power, distinct from memory and imagination, which are all that is presumed of a child, manifestly shews itself in these, the first human actions ; the power of perceiving the resemblance of two things, and then to determine the degree of harmony, or the beauty of them. The former we shall term wit, and the latter taste ; and shew that both powers are resident in him. Then, however it may fare with imitation, in which we have shewn all a child's endeavours to be taken up, it is wit and taste which must conduct the design, or nothing of a happy imitation is to be expected. We see patterns, we discern experiments evidently relative thereto, and of which the frequent repetitions are seen to bring forth perfect representations of those patterns. A pattern pre-supposes a comparison
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of the likeness of two things, an imitation, a determination of the degree of proximity, or distance; that is, it pre-supposes wit and nature.

§. 98.

Here we behold nature's preparatives for the execution of its great plan, although both the plan and work are seen only as it were in their cantours. It is indisputably certain, that in the progress of nature in these, its labours are such as would excite admiration, and the consequences so beneficial, that a child in a short time would be carried thereby to his destination, were it not for the opposition to its wise designs, which it must meet with in their first actings. The organs of speech must primarily be formed by the repetition of one and the same posture and disposition of the parts of the mouth, in order that all the parts of the pattern
selected

selected for imitation, that is, the sound, in all its distinct modulations, must be clearly and equally expressed, that the pattern may not be unmoveable; and the imitation taken from it, and the disposition of the organs be not obstructed. But so cruelly indulgent are we, that we hold discourses with a child in the like inarticulate and broken words which come from him, in his first attempts to enunciation; and thus the whole design of nature is frustrated for meer diversion. Innumerable hardships, likewise, which with equal wisdom we lay on a child, necessarily create ill-blood in him; and then this we most unjustly call wickedness.

§. 99.

Whatever we have now advanced in favour of a child, may be attributed to prejudice, and the high opinion of a child, with which at the very beginning we

we were possessed. They will alledge that only a proper direction of the organs of speech is wanting in beasts, to equal them in this imitation of man ; and that some of them actually do, as is evident from many instances ; and here the experiments always succeeded, according to the affinity of the figure, and disposition of their organs of speech to the human. The mode of thinking, and what is derived from thence, the discourse of most men, and even of some orators, are manifestly originated only from imagination and memory ; two faculties, which as yet have not been found in brutes to be of such different degrees, as to pronounce the difference essential, and so far to exalt the pre-eminence of a child. Thus human nature is decided from men as they appear to us, under all the mischiefs of a false education ; a decision as unjust as from the common culpable use of speech

to arraign the faculty. The true pre-eminence of man is, that to a compleat developement of his faculties, nothing less than eternity is sufficient; whereas a beast, even allowing it an eternal existence, would, in respect of its perfection, reap no further benefit from an eternity, than from its present short existence.

§. 100.

It is no reason for rejecting a plan of some noble undertaking, if its execution should in a few cases fall short of its end; and now, as nature in its processes requires some certain services from us, or at least, that we should not thwart its operations, and we give ourselves no manner of concern about either, thus its schemes, however great and perfect in themselves, may miscarry, and not through any deficiency or error in nature.

ture. The plan on which a beast acts, consists only of a rotation of three or four particulars, which it performs mechanically, without consciousness or instruction. To strike out new inventions according to the change of times, to make a judicious choice of expedients amidst the variety of occurrences, to form and conduct all his resolutions by the just rule of truth and perfection, are qualities of which we participate jointly with the Creator, and irrefragable vouchers of our claim to the sovereignty of the world, which we hold by his grant.

This is the transcendent plan which man is to execute ; and the more punctually he executes it, the nearer he approaches to that grandeur and perfection, for which the all-wise and gracious Being has destined him. The plan being great, the means which it pre-supposes, and which are grounded thereon, must be no less so ; and where there appears any want of congruity betwixt them, we are not from our duty
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of enquiring into nature, to assume the right of ignorantly censuring it.

§. 101.

For a proof that in the imperfect lisplings of a child in its endeavours to speak, the scope of nature, and the means it employs for its success, are equally great, we shall here exhibit a short sketch of the whole plan. Upon the emission of air from the lungs through the different apertures of the mouth, and by certain dispositions of the other organs of speech, are formed the sounds; and from the several connections of these words, the constituent parts of locution. It is indeed matter of admiration, that an entire language, with its infinite multitude of different words, is founded only on ten or twelve simple sounds, all its words being so many compounds only of different modifications of them, as of their elements.

elements. Let us suppose a language to consist of twenty thousand words, and such a one is not the most copious, each of these simple sounds, supposing them to occur equally, must be repeated above fifteen hundred-times, for the connection of them to produce so many words. Did we not know from experience with what ease a child gets a language, it might, with the greatest verisimilitude, be concluded from hence, as he need be master only of fourteen sounds (which, as little assistance as we give him, are very easily attained) from them to form and compose, and enounce any language which we shall prescribe to him.

§. 102.

Upon a close examination of the matter, nature opens to us a path, trod by the ancient Greeks and Romans; and which led them to that perfection which
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is still admired, though, after an imitation of so many ages, not yet equalled. However we may boast of the improvement of sciences, in works of taste and genius, the ancients bear the palm; as for any thing else, 'tis owing either to accident, or brought forth by a laborious application. These ancients, from their acquaintance with nature, made not the least difference betwixt words and things, betwixt language and science. They endeavoured to improve their language, and according to their success herein, their knowledge also increased; and upon a right view of the matter, nature does not in the least countenance this distinction; rather both are absolutely the same. A scholar thinks, judges, determines, proves; and does not every man do the like? Where then lies his mighty distinction from other men, among whom he passes for such a respectable person? Only in a talent of delivering his ideas,
opinions,

opinions, proofs, and determinations in proper words, and in his skill in diction and phraseology above others, who can talk of little but the common necessities of life.

§. 103.

A language, at least the language of every civilized nation, literature necessarily implying an improvement of the language, is a compass of words, expressing all things of which a man has any knowledge, and that justly, and in the connection in which the sound and understanding conceives them. Now, let the paucity of simple sounds be considered, and with what ease the multitude of words are arranged from them, a very few general rules sufficing for it, the enlargement of our knowledge not meeting with any impediment from the language, must depend only on our fixing to every
word

word a just idea, that is, to use speech conformable to nature's design ; and 'tis this wherein consists all the pre-eminence of a man of letters. Some among us, raucity of voice excepted, speak as in the days of Brennus and Arminius, because he thinks just as those rude ages, a hundred words relative to the circumstances of their employments, recurring continually in the same contracted sphere, pronounced always in the same manner, and to the usual number, ill connected, partly without any meaning, or an improper one ; these constitute the whole language of no small part of us ; but so little does this scanty jargon deserve the name of language, that compared with the idea which we have before given of language, it is but a kind of resemblance of it ; and no less inferior than the appearances of reason in brutes is to human reason.

§. 104.

A man may understand a hundred languages in the common currency of them, yet know no more than a child. Language is a just delineation of the world, or learning in perspicuous well chosen indications, a proper and precise idea being connected with every word of it. The common currency of a language is made up of a very insufficient and small rabblement of words, either of no meaning, or false, or indeterminate ; and what knowledge depends on it can be of no other nature. Yet is this the language in which children are brought up, and often there's too much necessity for it ; but when a child, designed for the sciences, that is, for a more explicit knowledge of the world, shews so little attention towards the enlargement of verbal knowledge, nothing can be concluded from
thence,

thence, but that a just idea of speech is wanting; for could we expect from the supreme wisdom and goodness a more facile way to this end, than that all the things in the world within the verge of human knowledge, together with all their combinations and proportions, should be depressed by such a small number of sounds, and from which a child finds no manner of difficulty in arranging into words? Can we do less for a child, for whom we yet are bound to do our utmost, and at the same time can any thing be easier, than to discourse with them in a neat and regular expression? And this is the substance of the concurrence which nature requires from us in its great purposes, and the assistance which a child expects from us towards its solid knowledge.

§. 105.

Learning being taken in this idea, which is rooted in nature, no man has a greater

greater aptitude for it than a child ; for a child, with the sound by which it denotes the first thing, conceives the thing itself ; and on similar occasions proceeds in the like manner, will, by this rule, be ever less apt to speak a word without a meaning, or to annex a false or improper idea to it, than even the scholar himself. For only to know a thing pre-supposes too many unnatural exercises, that learning of it should not cost a child many a painful conquest. Further, with a child, there is no need of learned digressions, didactical lectures fixing the meaning of a word, or labour-ed elucidations on the things, every word deriving its meaning from its connection with others ; and as for the things which a child is to conceive alone with every word, he'll be guarded against error, either by shewing him the things themselves, or representations of them ; and here lies all the necessary elucidation,
and

and if we neglect these, all others are to no purpose. *Nil est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in sensu*, is a rule both very antient and natural; it implies that a great part of our knowledge consists of experiments, and just inferences from them. As to enlargement of knowledge, all a child requires from us is, to make him acquainted with the first part; in the second he may, and must be left to himself; as from the proportion of the power of the understanding, shall be further shewn in the sequel.

§. 106.

Here I shall only observe, that the connections of a child are not at all productive of error, caprice, superstition, and especially the faults of the understanding; but that they manifestly are the fruits of that defectuous use of speech, which a child has had no opportunity of learning,

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but

but in its common currency ; and of our want of care to amend it ; and that it is no more chargeable upon a child than his birth, and his station in the world, which is the result of it. Follow nature, is an antiently venerated rule, as nature being the test of all science, the value of them must be determined from the degree of their congruity with nature. The views of nature are no other than those acquired by learning ; and which we never can be masters of to any perfection, without the means which nature points out to us ; all other means, however plausible or ardently pursued, must, as has been shewn of speech, only deflect us from our scope, they, of necessity, being either unnatural or contrary to nature.

§. 107.

Systems in general, when made the basis of instruction, as has confessedly
been

been the case in natural philosophy, have as it were embarrassed the entrance to the sciences with endless difficulties ; whereas the way by which the antients gained such reputation, was clear and easy ; it was the way of nature directed them to it. To omit the arbitrary positions and the hazarded conjectures, which yet as key-stones seem almost of indispensible necessity to the prosecution of one of these systems, yet is it highly unnatural to leave generals for particulars, the method which nature by an unalterable law prescribes to us, being quite the reverse. We are to be tutored to a clearer knowledge ; yet, is it pre-supposed, in order to such instructions, that we must already be possessed of it. For a general principal rule, and all that we admit in general, we cannot be said to understand, when we are not able to recollect all the simple occasions and ideas, or at least some of them, whence, by a higher

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degree

degree of particular address the former may be separated ; that is, the connection betwixt both is hid to us, whilst, for want of a sufficient knowledge of particular things, we are not arrived at a readiness in drawing conclusions from them to generals. Now if, according to the well-known *dicto de omni et nullo*, it be presupposed, that we must understand the general positions and reasons, in order to comprehend the proof of a truth, or the analogy of several conclusions, we must likewise have that penetration, in which we are to be instructed.

§. 108.

This procedure is perfectly of a piece with those by which, to speak regularly, we have been instructed ; and we, by a direct consequence, which plainly shews the close affinity betwixt both procedures, learn to think as judiciously as to speak, although

although indeed something mechanically. It has been shewn above, from the essence of speech, that, in respect of a child, it is a matter of indifference, not only in what language, but in what manner he is talked to; and that what mistakes he may happen to commit, are as little to be imputed to the language, as to the child's perception; but that they totally proceed from the faulty manner of conversing with him. Here we shall demonstrate, that a perfect language, that is, a language, the words whereof stand in a regular connection, is much easier learned than another, where this connection is with difficulty, if at all discoverable. For these arguments, with which this shall be evinced, will at the same time further convince us, that of all the avenues to the sciences, that in which nature leads us by means of speech, is incomparably the best.

§. 109.

In every language there must necessarily be but few general rules for a similar connection of its parts. A perfect language is that, in which this similarity of connection, or its general rules, are most facile and obvious, which contains the least variety, and for this reason are the easiest learned : for the very wit and taste with which a child imitates the first sounds, and sketches out the first strokes of his great plan ; these also conduct him in the progress of the work, the complication whereof is an important part of his destination, and which can prosper only so far as the endeavours of genius and taste prosper, or meet with no external opposition. The occupation of a child may be compared to a picture ; the formation of the sound is a preparation of the colours, the connection of the words is an imitation of nature in imagery ; or the world
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is the model, and speech a design or copy of it. The more exactly the proportions are betwixt them, that is, the more perspicuously and properly the order and harmony, which charms us throughout all nature, is exhibited by a near analogy in this oral design of it, the easier to taste and genius must the imitation thereof be.

§. 110.

To illustrate this by the art of penmanship, which gives the appellation of capital to those strokes of letters, from whence, on account of their likeness, these are all deducible, and therefore may be reduced to a small number. Thus the perfection of this art consists in making these capital strokes as general as possible, in the conformity of every single stroke of the letters with them, and that the differences therein be as little as possible: it is evident here, that the facility of imi-

tation is manifested in the very grounds of the perfection of this art ; harmony and proportion appearing more discernible in a small, than great number ; and this discernment is a great help to taste and genius ; or rather, it is no other than an operation of those faculties. Letters are marks of those simple sounds, from which small, infinitely small as the number of them is, the inexpressible multitude of words is, as we have before observed, composed by some general rules, and in a similar manner. These marks a most admirable art connects, and arranges in the same manner, for the same end, and in the same proportion of number, speech, and writing, being as it were, both models and imitations of each other ; so that the ground of facility and perfection must be the same in both, and in both rest in proportion, which shews itself to the least attention.

§. III.

Is then a perfect language more easily learned by a child than a defectuous one, as having in himself the rules necessary thereto, namely, the rules of taste and genius ; so that it need only see the whole in its best point of view ? Then the method of teaching locution to a child, on rules which he is pre-supposed to be acquainted with, has little more to say for itself, than if he was not permitted to walk till he was so far read in anatomy, as to understand the connection of the nerves, and muscles of his legs and feet, and in what manner motion is performed by them. Thus this cogitative faculty is taught ; the best rules, together with unexceptionable models, formed upon them, are offered to us. We place a high value on, and with all the gratitude due to the labours of eminent persons,

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sions, we accept of them, as those unexceptionable proofs a vast genius exercised in profound reflection ; however, as we are upon good grounds permitted to doubt, whether by one or other of the means, thus laid before us, we learn to think, and to think with solidity ; that is, when we can prove, that he who is able to make use of these rules and models, must previously have been conversant in the art of thinking.

§. 112.

It may however be affirmed, that by means of locution we learn to think, or that the exercises of speech implies an exercise of the understanding. Either words and thoughts, two things which nature has joined in the most intimate union, must be dis-joined, or it must be granted, that words of a grammatical must also have a logical propriety ; nature being equally
violated,

violated, whether we annex an improper or false idea to a word, or none at all; that is, whether we talk wrong, or without any thought. For if words be indications of our thoughts; if there be a necessary relation between them; if the representations of one be inseparable from those of the other, the regular connection of words, and the rules by which they are formed, must be without any grounds, or be grounded on a determinate arrangement of the thoughts, as these must correspond with the things themselves; that is, the rules of speech, to be in reality what things they are in nature, must also be the rules of reason: this has been defined an insight into the connection of things. Now locution, that admirable invention, by which all things with their differences, proportions, relations, and designs, and all their various combinations, are, by means of a few strokes, easily connected; and by
their

their connection conveying more knowledge, represented to us in the best order, and at the same time in one light; whereas otherwise, and without this incomparable adjunctment, its multitude would confound instead of informing.

§. 113.

It must be allowed that speech is not only a means of acquiring to reason this insight, but the only means. This was the opinion of the antients, and accordingly by practising the language, by discoursing, writing, and reading, just and fine thinking became habitual to them; and that at an age when, after far more laborious exercises, we are scarce at the rudiments of logic: and this is no more than a right procedure; for having hitherto been instructed not in language, but in lower matters, the distinguishing bad and good words, and the arrangement

arrangement and connection of the latter by a tedious rabblement of rules, which indeed include a sense, but without it, may be just and regular ; so that the habit proceeding from such matters, is so far from being reason, that there is rather need of teaching it us by particular rules, as a thing unknown. But on this very account, that this habit is not reason, and yet, all that in the case aforementioned is acquirable, the use and tendency of these rules is something mysterious, as they pre-suppose a perspicacious and well-informed reason. For there is but one way by which a child can attain to the use of judgment, in being very early accustomed, by suitable occupations, to practice the rules of thinking laid down to him by nature in the first principles of his faculties ; then is reason a habit, which, like all others, is acquired by use of exercises agreeable to nature. This may decide the dispute, which

which of mother-wit or school-wit is preferable. For either we have reason, or have it not ; and both cases, according to the idea which we have given of reason, are possible : in the first case logic prescribes us rules, by which we have already very often practised, and all that remains is to learn some new words ; and, in the latter case, it is for bringing into order a power which we are without, or have it not in its natural direction ; an undertaking as much effected by any rules, as for a deformed body to be reduced to its proper shape by the rules of dancing.

§. 114.

It is a perfection of nature, whereby it convinces us in a very sensible manner of the greatness of its author ; that in all its stupendous works, multifarious and different as they are, it always proceeds

ceeds in one similar congruent manner, both in its designs, and the means of which they are conducted ; but in man, the master-piece of nature, has the melancholy pre-eminency of making a most deplorable exception. Reason, that clear discernment of good and evil, exaggerates the pleasure, and abates the trouble, which wise nature has planted as the limits of right in all dealings, and likewise of happiness ; and thereby involves the conceptions of the understanding, and the sensations of the heart in a perpetual war, which embitters the whole life. How wretched the lot of mankind ! But is this man, as he came from the Creator's hands, or rather a work of art, which in no place more than here departs from the design of it, which was an imitation of nature ? The best way of deciding this question, is by attending to nature's process in forming the heart and understanding of a child.

§. 115.

Reason, penetration, understanding, wit, and presence of mind; these endowments of real great men, of such advantage to themselves in all circumstances of life, and whereby they are enabled to perform such eminent services to the public, must, as to the term or principle of them, be grounded, though latent, in the mind of a child; these must accomplish the plan, to which the continual activity, the incessant labour of the mind, is limited, as to its unalterable purpose. These things being evidently certain, nature's questions become very natural; which are the faculties of a child, for which nature has such great ends; and what the means used for the developement and cultivation of the same towards making that appearance which we venerate in men. These questions carry us back to the children

children whom we had left, the faculties of a child, and their proportion to the destination of them being to be learned from a child. There is indeed a shorter way, by adopting the sentiments of those who, and not without some probability, maintain imagination and memory to be the only faculties in a child ; if, thereby, the difference betwixt children and creatures of an inferior genius was not made so small, that we must be very indulgent to class them among mankind.

§. 116.

But from the eminent degree in which a child possesses both those powers, he may possibly derive a just claim to them, and therein may lie the grounds of his future greatness. This is not altogether improbable. Else wherefore did our careful teachers make it their sole business to shake our memory with these words, phrases

phrases and opinions, if they had perceived in us any other faculties than memory and imagination, or judged any other necessary to the attainment of our destination? It is a duty to the memory of those deserving personages, carefully to examine this point. First, let us canvass our idea of these powers, in order to discover the design of them, and their analogy to man's destination; the imagery of one or more sensitive things, and in the order in which our senses presented them to us, or the repetition of such images, or any single one in the absence of the subject of them, and the certain recollection, when such images recur to us, that they have been in our minds before: of these powers the former is termed imagination, and the latter memory.

§. 117.

Though this point be of such evidence, yet leading to a determination of one
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which may seem of some difficulty, we shall illustrate it by an example. An open book lies before us, we see in it several ranks of words ; that is, a perfect image of the page, with all the words we see on it, is formed in the reticular tunica of the eye, as the mirror represents every object, from which rays of light are reflected on its surface. These ranks of words we conceive according to the clearness of the image of them in the eye. Remove the book, the representation still remains ; and the conception is so lasting, that when any of those words again occur, we are certain of its being a word of which, in conjunction with others on the leaf, we had a representation. Thus far reaches imagination and reminiscency, and these are the necessary laws of their operations. There is also a certain coherence of words, no less necessary than a connection of the things themselves which they denote.

But

But in respect of this, these powers are so indifferent, that with them order is the casual concurrence of things without reason or design; and the perfection of those powers must be calculated only from the large assemblage of things they retain, and the readiness and certitude of the recollection.

§. 118.

Now in order to teach a child to think justly, it seems only necessary to place the things which are to be offered to the imagination and memory in a regular coherence, and the words, as we have done, in their natural order; for thus, from the laws of imagination, a child will rightly connect one series of wise thoughts and actions with others; that is, according to the most common idea of that word, he will learn to think and act regularly. I grant there is a certain way of thinking,
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and not uncommon; which, both in respect of the connection and the number of words, entirely rests on the memory; but whether it deserves that name, or nature has appointed the memory for thought, is matter of doubt with me; at least, whenever the judgments, conclusions and proofs of memory are just, it must be owing to meer accident.

§. 119.

To this will readily subscribe any one who can distinguish the effects of memory, and a blind imitation, from the effects of understanding and genius; two things scarce less different from each other than waking and dreaming. Let us imagine a man of such universal talents, such a comprehensive knowledge, such an elevated genius, distinguishing himself so conspicuously from the mass of mankind, that he seems to belong to a higher rank
of

of beings ; place him in a condition where his ample soul can use only part of its vast abilities, in a fluctuating state of clear and obscure conceptions ; this paragon of intelligence will sink into such a proximity, if not even an inferiority to the very lowest order, the boundaries between man and the brute : however the mode of thinking, which here predominates in dreams, is such as imagination and memory, without the support of higher power, would produce. A series of conceptions, which, according to the laws of imagination and memory, have a perfectly just and close analogy ; that is, which have only a general connection as we perceived the subjects of them at the same time, or have some common predicament ; but which yet are not in any intimate dependance, or any natural combination ; such a set of conceptions, I say, forms a dream, or the mode of thinking ; the sense whereof lies only in memory and imagination.

§. 120.

Lastly, how is a liberal curiosity, that spur to knowledge, that quintessence of reason, not to mention the faculties above specified, to be accounted for ; if imagination and memory, from which it cannot be originated, are the only faculties of a child ? Are these the powers by which a child is destined to discover similitude, proportion, beauty and harmony in all things, and to be passionately addicted to such re-searches. This no body will assert ; and yet as little will any body acquainted with children deny them such a curiosity.

It must be granted that to assert, that with respect to understanding, a child is possessed only of these powers, and to exercise him in employments dependant only on them, is no less than to believe nature made a child to be a meer machine,

chine, only with something more ingenuity; and that the views of nature are answered in making a child a complete machine. All the office of imagination and memory is to be subservient to our knowledge, in reclaiming the images of useful and masterly subjects; from which a higher power, like a skilful painter, arranges into that immense and august picture, which the world exhibits in its infinite combinations.

§. 121.

If it be necessary that we should have a sense of the things which are present to us, or which operate on our senses, no less necessary is it that we should represent them to ourselves, and retain the representation. For instance, when we open our eyes, it no longer is in our option, whether we will behold that Iris illustrating the gloomy sky, with its lively
affortment

assortment of the most beautiful colours, and consequently whether we will represent it to ourselves ; both are points of necessity. Let us here add another position no less certain, which is, that nature has concentrated all complacency and delight in the proper use of the several faculties ; so that to make a particular business of learning by heart, may be said to be nothing else, but to turn into an unnatural constraint, what a child would otherwise perform, and even with delight ; nothing but a humour to controul nature which we should follow, and which we never shall follow, but to our benefit. Our young stranger in the world, says one, than whom none understood the world better, is deeply concerned to be made acquainted with his new abode. His curiosity which, as all things affect him, shews itself in all things with so much impatience, not only manifests this, but likewise the only means of at-

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taining his great aim. Is then, to learn, taking the word in its natural import, any thing else than to become better acquainted with the world?

§. 122.

To set this in a clearer light, and to shew that memory need not be cultivated by any particular means, but only those of a direct tendency thereto, though learning were the more immediate destination of a child, I shall here offer a concise specimen of a school education, which being free from the disadvantages of other institutions, may be called the school of nature. It has already been noticed, that in his endeavours, a child acts the painter, and aims at nothing less than a complete picture of the universe, in all its various relations: the best assistance we can give to nature, and this deserves to be the scope of a school, is to reduce the
world

world within the shortest compass possible; that is, so to unite the infinite number of beauties diffused through this immense whole into one point of view, that a child, as it were at one glance, may take them all into his eye.

§. 123:

In pursuance of this principle, on the justness of which depends the whole success of this scheme, our school is to contain three classes, and as many separate places for their instruction. The first class is to be a chamber of the works of nature, the second a chamber of imagery, and the third a chamber of the works of art. For the quicker dispatch in the first class, a child shall be taught the order, connection, and destination of natural things; together with the means whereby it is completed. The attention of the second shall be conversant with the moral

characters of men, and the histories and revolutions of states. In the third, the child shall be led to the knowledge of all the arts as imitations of nature, according to the advantages which they procure to the human life, and in their several improvements. It cannot be doubted but that this school will be a very entertaining theatre, and the three classes as so many acts, with which our young spectator will be highly taken ; and the greater his pleasure, the greater his proficiency in solid instruction. Memory, without any direction of ours, will not be wanting in its duty ; or rather, we may be assured, that every thing deserving its attention, will at the same time recommend itself to his reflection. We ourselves shall also be no small gainers by our pains, being then invested with the like office, and consequently, having the same attentive admirers, those who are appointed to shew the rarities of a place, and, for
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this purpose, to be the guides to foreigners.

§. 124.

An excellent scheme ! cries one, were it practicable, or not so extreamly difficult. Instead of a prolix argumentation to demonstrate the contrary, we shall lay down another method, whereby this scheme may be carried to execution, without the least difficulty ; the three before-mentioned chambers, we shall, with little alteration, turn into so many book-cases of the same different contents. The business both of pupil and teacher would still be the same ; and in both methods memory would not be sur-charged for a small and select collection of books, with inclination and aptitude to use them, from the man of letters ; and at the same time mark the plan, by which a child must be trained for that end. But to this inclina-

tion and aptitude, higher powers are presupposed than memory and imagination ; and possibly more languages than are to be obtained by them. But this may be confidently asserted, that these powers, however rectified and improved, can never be made productive of any superlative reason or sagacity.

§. 125.

And yet reason, judgment, understanding, sagacity and presence of mind, are what a child is by nature destined to, no less than a man ; other and higher qualities, more nearly relative to, and influential towards these great ends of nature, he must also be possessed of. Their qualities have been before observed to declare themselves in the first human actions of a child, in his prattle. Our only business here, is to examine their proportion to nature's end ; and how it
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is accomplished by these, as so many well-chosen means. Reason, by which a child discovers the similitude betwixt the two first sounds, and proposes one for his imitation; this same judgment manifests itself afterwards in a hundred other doings, which, from our indifference to children, or from an opinion that the like is visible in brutes, appear to us beneath our attention. It is true, beasts act with a propriety, which long since produced an opinion of some degree of rationality in them. Is this very judgment, but a judgment which cannot rise above its appointed mark? whereas the reason of a child will be continually unfolding itself through the endless ages of eternity.

§. 126.

So musing is the variety of things in the world, that we once could not but for

ever despair of getting any knowledge of them sufficient to form a judgment, were we not possess'd of the means of contracting this incomprehensible multitude of things within a number suitable to our capacities, and yet without losing any thing of the whole. But this is practicable only where different parts of this whole have certain qualities in common, and so far may be reckoned the same; or where those parts, by a few general laws, are connected with the whole, in a manner fixedly similar. Both these cares occur in the constitution of the world, and in both, 'tis resemblance only which can preserve our speculations from that confusion in which otherwise they would unavoidably be involved. A power of discerning this resemblance in all things, is not the least ground on which may be founded a sure conclusion of a child's high destination; this being the instrument of all knowledge worthy of a man, and

and the manifestations of it in a child, being the surest presages of every mental accomplishment.

§. 127.

A very obvious resemblance is, when many things are seen to agree in respect of certain properties ; and as this discernment is facile, so if a child only has necessary attention, it opens a very spacious field of knowledge, leading us to the general ideas of the nature and species of things ; whereby not only the prodigious multitude of things is reduced within a small compass, but they enable a child, only from the resemblance, to judge of the constituent qualities of the nature and species ; and from one thing to know all which belong to a general idea. What an arrangement for perception, speculation and decision ! Is the attainment of truth, are scientific discoveries, real pleasures,

and is a child naturally addicted thereto; then is it a mistaken indulgence, or rather, it is cruelty to amuse a child with a jejune knowledge, which of himself he will, can, and must find out. Set before him a sufficient number of single things and cases, and place them in that light which will best shew their resemblances; then his genius being in its sphere, will acquit itself of its duty, with pleasure and admirable ingenuity.

§. 128.

If it be the business of reason to collect ideas, and by speculations and decisions to unite them, a child not only has reason, but is spontaneously disposed to lay hold of every opportunity that offers to practice and improve it. His genius, inspirited by one successful discovery, becomes more enterprizing; and with re-doubled alacrity, investigates resemblances,

blances, which require a closer attention, and cuts itself out a way to more ample discoveries. Nature forwards him in it, indicates to him the resemblances in the relations betwixt causes and effects, means and ends, the parts and the whole. A child, contracted as the sphere of his experience is, finds, that like circumstances will produce like consequences; that every effect is a design, and every design a mean to higher designs; that an uninterrupted connection seems to reign among all the things about him. That significant *why*, which is continually in the mouth of a child, almost as soon as his eyes are open, shews, that in a world, which being so correspondent to his necessities, he judges to be made for him, he expects order, combination, and harmony, and accounts himself authorized to seek for it every where. A child pre-supposes what men wrangle about, that for every thing there must be

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be a sufficient reason ; and this is all the instruction which a child expects from us, and the only thing which renders our conversation of any advantage to him ; otherwise he could easily dispense with it.

§. 129.

Is it then possible that a child can be totally indifferent, or, which indicates a higher degree of perverseness, be unattractive, when that instruction, which by his nature he so passionately thirsts after, is with-held from him ; and on the contrary, doctrines inculcated into him, to which, whatever speciousness they may have, he is indisposed ? Can his reluctance against our endeavours, though ever so well meant to make a technical lexicon of him, give offence ? This has already been decided in the discussion of that weighty question, what is that
whereby

whereby a child is destined to a distinguishing attention? We have shewn that the grounds thereof are to be sought for in that sensation of the mind, which has the closest and justest relation to the difference of things; and this is likewise to be noticed here. For it is known what confusion has been introduced into ethics, by placing the freedom of man in a power of determining without sufficient grounds, and thereby making him rather an irrational, than a rational free creature: and this must be the case in logic, whilst the understanding is held to be in a total indifference about the perfection of external objects; and we imagined that it is as little from any order, beauty, and harmony without man, as from any pleasure within him; which must consist in a just relation to external things, that he bestows a distinguishing attention on some things preferable to others.

§. 130.

Can it be thought, that in a world full of order, a mind destined to comprehend such a world in the whole circle of its beauties; a mind of incessant activity, continually busied in forming itself after this great pattern, and sensible of equality to it: I say, how can it be thought of such a mind, that in such a relation to such a world, it is void of a strong sensation and delight in truth and perfection. Should we discover any end or means in its movements, any plan in the connection of them, would man, would the world in general, be what they actually are, and what, according to the all-wise ends of their gracious Creator, who has placed them in this near affinity they must be; if the latter displayed a succession of affecting and instructing scenes, and the former were a listless insensible spectator?

spectator? It cannot be, for that same sentiment, which pleads so strongly in us, for goodness and order in the moral world, carries us with no less energy towards perfection in the kingdom of truth. Take away either, and by the same natural consequence, man will be a monster in speculation and practice.

§. 131.

Attention is an exercise of the perceptive power on an external object, and is ever proportionate to the degree of the perfection of the object. For instance, being in a gallery of paintings, my eye is taken with the most masterly picture, and at the same time a fine piece of music strikes my ears ; each affects me, according to its real merit, and both seem deserving of all my attention, both promising equal pleasure. A deep and precise comparison of the two objects,

jects, might indeed lead us to a right judgment in our choice ; but by retarding the decision, would in more momentous junctures be highly pernicious ; and we should at last declare for that piece, the first impression of which had gained the approbation of taste ; for understanding, which busies itself about the reason, is only so far right, as under the guidance of good taste, or as a habit of this happy sentiment. Whatever pleases and affects us, and affects us in very different degrees, derives that force with which it operates on the mind, from the apparently different degrees of perfection in things ; yet shall not all these, though every affecting stroke of perfection be interwoven in their nature, any wise affect us, or not adequately ; if we want sentiment, or even have it not in a proportionate degree. It is a law of nature, that in respect of their greatness, there must be a stated and constant proportion betwixt

betwixt power and effect ; and this proportion makes no inconsiderable part of the admirable excellence of its economy. Never for the external impression to be no stronger nor weaker, than according to the worth of the thing itself, depends on taste ; and though every thing in man should correspond with this law, even thus taste comprehends in it every pre-eminence both of mind and heart.

§. 132.

It is taste which is the motive and the true impulse, whereby the soul is kept in constant action ; it is the power by which the soul, a virtue of its own, forms itself in the justest manner to its perfection. Other external motives there are, by which a child's attention may be determined to particular things, as rewards and punishments ; however both pre-suppose a want of taste, that necessary

sary and natural impulse ; and, however discretely managed, are bad signs, as never supplying the want of taste. Further, as we know, that to maintain taste, more than diligence is required, and that indifference alone is sufficient to extinguish it ; so all the dangers which can be apprehended in the formation of a child's mind, are to be feared from the use of this means ; for as we cannot make of a child what we will, but must necessarily make of him what nature will ; yet, on the contrary, by the use of this means, he may be moulded at pleasure into every form, though one only can be natural.

§. 133.

If the pleasure of the mind consists in the moderate exercise of its faculties, as is shewn in genius and taste, and therein it must consist, the habits which constitute its perfections, proceeding from
them,

them, as a natural consequence; then either aversion to the occupations of this exercise, or the occupations themselves, must be unnatural. But as in the first case the mind must contradict itself, and traverse its own endeavours; the conclusion is, that the occupations to which it shows a settled repugnancy, must be unnatural. And this is the case when external motives may be called in, to remove the opposition which the mind exerts against an unnatural labour, by the preponderancy of this auxiliary power; and thus it is necessitated to a direction quite opposite to nature. A consequence the more detrimental, as the motives which produce this effect thus contrary to nature, are continually present to the mind, and form that opposition, by which the restoration of the natural state becomes next to impossible, being even a part of the mind, and consequently

frequently not to be eliminated by any human power.

§. 134.

The good mind is extremely hurt, when it considers what power men have over men, and how liable man, the noblest work of the creation, is to be depraved thereby, and metamorphosed into a loathsome monster ; and to this fate they, the formation of whom has been conducted with a distinguishing care, and according to all the rules of art, are more liable than they who are left to nature and themselves. Possibly the rules of education hitherto laid down, are not so infallible, that we can warrant consequences, as may be justly required of us. This may be granted by those who very confidently make it their rule, yet will not be answerable for it. At least, in a point of this moment, no step is to be hazarded whilst any doubt remains ;

remains ; and an enquiry for the removal of it is of equal necessity towards our tranquility and justification.

§. 135.

And not only to our tranquility and justification, but especially towards facilitating this business. For an effort contrary to nature, and in which our drift is to curb it, necessarily meets with such difficulties from nature's opposition, which is often very spirited, as must from time to time interrupt its progress ; and not seldom, to our very sensible mortification, totally baffles our scheme. And were we so abject, as under all these sufferings, to solace ourselves in the pleasures of an unlimited power, like Dionysius, who gratifying his despotic humour in a school, little laid to heart the loss of his crown ; yet are unnatural habits formed in us with much more difficulty than such as are natural.

natural. The sprightly and agreeable genius, which, as the genuine product of nature, can alone secure our fortunate progress, together with its concomitant heart-felt advantages, are lost and extinguished ; a loss for which no intellectual qualities are an equivalent. “ Joy, “ according to *Batteux*, than whom none “ ever saw further into human nature, “ is the certain attendant on a benevolent “ heart; it spreads as influential glory “ round the soul ; hence it delights in “ an exuberant communication of that “ felicity which itself enjoys ; whereas “ envenomed melancholy preys upon “ the heart, and instigates it to revenge its tortures on all within its “ sphere.”

§. 136.

All the pre-eminence of understanding, sagacity, acuteness, and presence of mind, are to the wit and taste of a child,

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as habits to their faculties, or effects to their causes. But all habits arising from exercise, and exercise, as occasioned by nature itself, being an operation of strength, which is continually exerting itself in the enlargement of its limits; so must every act of a child be a step, by which he advances towards that perfection, to which, by virtue of these faculties, he is destined. But even these acts, whereby he advances with such success, must also be acts of the genius and taste, as by them reminiscency and imagination, those instructive faculties, must be repelled, and confined to the limits nature has marked out for them. Exercise is the soul of all, and it is produced by the efforts of nature.

This we'll evidence in the manner of a child's learning a foreign language, this being made a capital business to him, and very justly, as from thence are reap'd all the advantages of travelling; without

out the hazards, we become acquainted with the customs, manners, sentiments, and particular characters of a foreign nation ; our horizon insensibly expands itself, and we are raised above the prejudices of a narrow sphere ; possibly also, a foreign language may exhibit to us a mode of fine and natural thinking, which in our own language we have not met with ; at least, without the aid of a foreign tongue, we should miss of the best exercise for learning to think in our own. But, whatever the motives are, it is a settled point, that besides the vernacular tongue, some other must be learned, and of this preference, *Latin* has a prescription of a long succession of ages ; and if the advantages of it be of such weight, the learning of it is so easy, that all a child has to do, is to learn to annex to the *Latin* words those ideas and conceptions which belongs to the words in his own language.

§. 137.

And this being the substance of what is done in translating from one language into another, so the whole business of a child learning the *Latin*, may be limited to the performance of a translator. The first thing, to which his endeavours herein are to be directed is, that he be thoroughly grounded in his mother tongue; for being, by means of that, to learn the *Latin*, and as without rightly understanding the correspondent word in his own language, he'll be puzzled with a foreign word; it necessarily follows, that a child should be able properly to express in his vernacular tongue, every idea within the compass of his knowledge; and that the learning a foreign one, be no more than a substitution of words, perfectly of the like import. They are both

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equally.

equally easy to a child, and what difficulty may be found in the latter, will immediately cease when the former is rectified. As for the perfection of a speech, these are the two points in which it consists, a sufficient *copia verborum*, and a regular connection of them ; so that the sole stumbling-block to a child's progress in language, must be one of these two. Now since a language partly consists of primitive words, but much more of derivations ; and that the derivations, and alterations of the latter, are done in the same manner, and by as few simple general rules, as the connection of words in colloquy ; the genius of a child, discerning the resemblance, may, with the like facility, both enlarge his scanty language, and express himself with propriety.

§. 138.

These advantages are acquirable only, by conversing in a language which has
these

these properties ; but if, to this end, in the third or fourth year he is put on exercises, which may be some employment to his genius, besides forwarding his progress, there will be this very considerable advantage ; that thus a child, in his tenderest years, becomes accustomed to method and regularity. Now as much, or rather all, depends on the child's clearly representing to himself, the single syllables of a word, since the alterations of words, and the invention of general rules, grounded thereon, relates only to some syllables, by which this word is prolonged in a manner generally uniform ; therefore writing, by which a child becomes to distinguish every letter, is an exercise of such necessity, that he should be put upon it, whenever his hand is fit to draw a stroke ; and begin with such strokes, as, for some time, may stand for letters.

§. 139.

Thus a child becomes the discoverer of most words, and of the rules of their construction ; which he will likewise be in respect of the *Latin*, and with greater facility, being now no more practised in discoveries of this kind, and that language having fewer particular rules than any other whatever : so far is it an easy matter, and can admit of no further difficulty, the entire practice of learning *Latin* in the best method being, without any of those long-winded preparations of learning single words, and their variations, and the rules of Syntax, to enter upon translating from one language into the other, as then translation must necessarily appear to us what it really is, a version of synonymous words, in the purity and force of both languages. Yet is nothing more detrimental, than a painful

ful investigation of the rules of construction, and to be ever making double translations, according to the peculiar idioms of each language; as hereby the chain of thought is broke, and the attention pinned down to words, without any ideas accompanying them; and the matter, which should be an agreeable trial of wit and genius, is made dull memory-work.

§. 140.

A child having learned in this manner to translate a *Latin* author, for instance, *Aurelius Victor*, into *German*, and to turn it again into *Latin*; it must be acknowledged, that he has learned something of importance, as paving the way to *Livy*, and progressively to all the other writers of antiquity; and, by this method, this may be dispatched at an age, which otherwise is taken up with arduous preparatives for a slight enterprize. This is incon-

testably clear, only the want of the grounds of a language may be objected to this method of learning. In compliance to these objectors, I shall subjoin two observations ; first, that a child proceeding with perfect regularity, cannot be said to be unacquainted with rules, tho' he cannot repeat them, no more than he can be said to know rules, which he can fluently repeat, yet is not able to apply. Secondly, an acquaintance with rules, which on a hundred occasions he has rightly applied, and thus by practice has a thorough conception of, will not require more days, than it will cost him years to acquire a certain use of rules, to whose particular connections he is a stranger. These observations are verified by experience, and confirmed by what has been said above of reason.

§. 141.

The greatest Rhetoricians of all ages have accounted translating to be the best way

way for attaining a propriety and dignity, both of thought and expression. If the efforts of children be but faint commencements, yet are they the beginnings to a great undertaking ; and such should be all the endeavours of a child. Wit and taste, which are taken up with imitation, and concenter in one end, here find their model, and in a point of view, than which nothing can be imagined fitter for imitation, words denoting so many ideas and sentiments, and in the order as conceived and felt by the best geniuses ; to see these words united in a perfect model, to imitate them, and yet learn neither to think or feel, is a plain mark of not being destined thereto ; the one and the other being impossible, or possible, only after this manner.

§. 142.

Both the choice of expression, and the discernment of the degree of con-

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formity, with the model, exercises the taste on which confidence grounds itself; and animated by prosperous commencements, and the views of higher degrees of perfection, redoubles its efforts with increasing success. For in regard of taste, and the formation of the mind dependant thereon, the capital point is to have the entire of every thing before the eyes. Proportion, design, order, perfection, clear discoveries, no less delightful than important, and by which all things first become interesting to us, are the fruits of this arrangement. The world, throughout its vast expanse, is a whole, and all individual things as means and ends, effects and causes, so connected with the whole, that they relate to each other, in a regular proportion, as the radiuses of a circle, drawn from a common center. The discernment of the grounds and laws of nature's simple manner of acting, depends on the resemblance we perceive in the proportions of parts to a whole,

whole, of means to their end, and of effects to their causes ; and again, the perception of general ideas, by which we divide all things into genuses and species, arises from the resemblance of the properties of things ; thus does genius, the object of which are resemblances, forming itself by them, in knowledge, judgment and sagacity, require that every thing whereby it is to be improved, be exhibited to it in its absolute Entire.

§. 143.

But much more does taste require this ; for though the discovery of truth be both the best exercise of the mind, and in itself very delightful, yet will truth but faintly affect us, if it does not at the same time exhibit to us perfection, order and beauty. But that which constitutes an object entire and complete, is the relation of what we distinguish in it, to a com-

mon point, the center of beauty and perfection, which taste always discovers, as its peculiar province, the object being in its full view.

This is the only advantageous disposition, for the eyes of a child, the point of view in which every thing appears to him in its true light. This end, possibly, is never so well attained, as by learning a language, this being a whole comprehending every object of human knowledge, as so many parts. For a readiness in thinking, and a readiness in speaking, are so much the same, that the degree of one may be determined from that of the other. Thus the discourse of a child has a certain degree of perfection, correspondent to the degree of his knowledge; but this perfection never reaches its height, till the contracted speech of a child is carried to all possible improvement, both in respect of number of words, and their connection: so that the occupation

tion of a child is limited to a few easy exercises, which are also those of a man, when he thinks, judges and determines, all the difference being, that he is more ready at them.

§. 144.

It being impossible to unite together two contradictory ideas, the one destroying the other ; and every idea of a thing is, at the same time, an idea of the properties and proportions thereof, by which being necessarily determined in what relation it stands with other things, a child may confidently be left to itself for the discovery of systems, or rather this must be left to him, it being the only way of training him up to think. As a trial of what may be committed to the inventive faculty of a child, and with what ease he may become acquainted with the sciences, take an entire system, and reduce it into
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its simplest parts, single words : this forms a dictionary, consisting of as many parts as there are arts and sciences, but not near so numerous ; the number of words peculiar to every one being but small : these words are either already known to him, or, in the manner before laid down, he is very easily taught the idea of them, on a supposition that a child, in its preceding instruction, has not learned to enounce words without thinking on them. Thus is he provided with a sufficient store of materials, and the rules for raising and completing the edifice are such as, *sola natura duce*, he has practiced on innumerable occasions ; but for a child, without prejudice or error, and not with its adapted parts, to re-build a structure taken to pieces, must be acknowledged an amazing work.

§. 145.

If a child is wholly to attend to truth, of which he is naturally a friend ; and if, of all others, he be least inclined to give his assent to opinions, from the majority of voices, and never can too early learn to know, how little what he knows is comparatively to the whole, and in the whole how little of certitude ; this proposal may then promise itself some countenance. But if it be necessary, that, as soon as it is possible, a child should learn to be its own guide, and to delight in beneficial occupations, which can never be made too easy ; then is this proposal intitled to a still greater regard, as it aggregates all sciences into one point of view, where the whole may be attentively examined ; and thus learning, from a dull intricate occupation, becomes what it really is, the knowledge of felicity.

§. 146.

§. 146.

The faculties of the understanding, which, as so many different parts, by their determined proportion to wholes, constitute its rectitude, have their different degrees, which are not less various than the proportions into which they may be contracted. It is possible also, that one understanding may differ from others, not only in the degrees of ready cogitation, but even in respect of the rules and method for thinking. Two celebrated persons, equally admired for the solidity of their writings, and who, as to the rules of thinking, are perfectly agreed ; yet in a position, which one has found out by these rules, and proves by a course of argumentation, the difference may be such, that his antagonist shall, from the very same rules, demonstrate the contrary. Now, comparing one understanding

derstanding with another of the same kind, when both think, judge, and decide, according to the same rules ; and these rules being as little contradictory to each other, as the proceedings emaning from them : the difference of understanding betwixt these two reasoners must lie, not in the degree of it, but in their mode of cogitation.

§. 147.

If such be the difference in the perceptions of the understanding, the inclinations of the will are not more uniform ; but the difference between truth and falsehood, good and evil, being eternal, and grounded on the nature of things, rectitude of understanding and will can be but one ; though in respect of degree, there may be differences in both, yet without prejudice to the rectitude, Of understanding we have already treated, let us now take a nearer view of the will :

will : like the understanding, the will is determined by the impressions naturally made on it by outward things. In all the things which surround us, as there is not only a particular degree of perfection, by which, as has been shewn concerning taste, they affect us sometimes more, sometimes less, but also they have a nearer, or more remote relation to our happiness ; that is, there is in them a certain degree of good.

§. 148.

Taste, which by the correspondence of a certain degree of delight, with a like degree of beauty in an object, forms the understanding ; even taste also influences the will by sensations, which never fails to answer the degree of good and evil. From the sensations only, are originated all the inclinations and passions, increasing by use, in the same manner as the habits of the understanding, by the use

use of its faculties. But as we begin to feel before we think, the heart often is entirely formed, when the first traces of the understanding have scarce begun to show themselves. Hatred, anger, revenge and envy, those constant attendants on uneasiness and discontent, would never have found place in them, had proper care been taken to remove from them the objects of these disagreeable sensations, and to have impregnated them with the softer movements of confidence, tenderness, &c. for both the agreeable and disagreeable sentiments, in time grow up to passions; which are productive either of a gentle and humane, of a malignant and ferocious disposition; and the disagreeable impressions being stronger in the mind than the agreeable, the bitter and virulent passions will take root, and shoot up much sooner than the mild and beneficent.

§. 149.

A child of an evil disposition, feeling itself unhappy, must be concluded to hate all mankind indiscriminately, or harbours a secret diffidence of them, which does not spare even his father, unless of very singular tenderness. Remonstrances and severities, which are looked upon as the only remedies in such cases, produce no effect, or rather inflame the distemper: how indeed can it be otherwise, whilst a child mistrusts our intentions, and we, with all our assiduity, cannot remove the mistrust? We are wanting in regard to a child, our knowledge of him is so superficial, that in a hundred things we must, as has been shewn, prejudice him unknowingly. It behoves us to give him a more favorable idea of mankind than what he has, and which we have occasioned. In short, let all concerned
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in his education endeavour, by every token of good will, to conciliate his love; by this alone, eruptions of very malignant passions are restrained; and it is likewise the best method for giving a gentle turn to his disposition.

§. 150.

If we further call in the exercises of fine taste, this insures our success, according to the just and antient maxim;

*Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes
Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros.*

Ovid. *de Ponto*, lib. ii. el. 9.

For taste, which has been shewn to be a sure guide in forming a judgment of truth and falsehood, does not leave us quite at an uncertainty about good and evil; and generous sentiments ever kindle at an exalted character well depicted,

depicted, and, if flagg'd, revive with fresh spirits. A child, compounded of all the worst qualities of children, heady, disobedient and refractory, impatiently averse to any thing of trouble and application, with a sinister cunning for compassing his drift by oblique ways, and hardened to a superlative degree, that all the repeated demonstrations of the most endearing affection were lost upon him ; yet was he reclaimed only by an animated representation of real heroism.

§. 151.

One day, among other histories, which used to be told him, as it were only by way of entertainment, the conversation fell on *Epaminondas*. This noble *Theban*, continued his tutor, had a very early sense of the contempt into which his country was brought, by the ignorance
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and supineness of the men in power. He was above esteeming diversions and idleness, as privileges of his birth, which entitled him to the chief offices of the state. Tranquility, under an ignominious prepossession, said he, is but an easy yoke, 'tis the sword that must gain us that consideration, by which alone an equitable and lasting peace is to be procured. This wisdom was a fruit of his unwearied application to literature, contrary to the practice of the *Thebans*, who minded nothing but bodily exercises. He took the field against a nation, who hitherto had treated the *Thebans* as their slaves, and whose name carried terror with it; these were the haughty *Spartans*, and these he totally defeated, and improved his victory, so as fully to convince his countrymen of the truth of his assertion. Such services gave him a further right to a higher rank, yet he quietly saw others, far beneath him in merit, placed

placed over his head, attentive only to prevent any ill consequences of such an injurious choice, and accordingly he retrieved the army, when half lost. He knew of no advantage but that of the state, to which he was always ready to sacrifice his possessions and person. It had been the policy of the *Persians*, to set the petty states of *Greece* at variance, that thus they might weaken each other; the surest way to this they rightly judged was to bribe the leading men of every state to be their incendiaries. A *Persian* agent artfully insinuated to *Epaminondas* the offer of a vast sum, but received this unexpected answer. “If the king has any designs, which are for the good of my country, I’ll second them without any gratuity; if they are otherwise, all his treasures wont bias me; adding, the whole world is nothing to me, in comparison of my love to my country.” Such a personage, who by his probity, valour and capacity, was

was the palladium of the state, by whom, from being despised, it was become formidable, could not be indifferent to the enemy, as appeared in his last battle ; where they, aiming rather at his destruction than the victory, made the strongest push where *Epaminondas* commanded ; he received a wound, which he was sensible would be his death when the arrow was drawn out ; but would not permit it, till he had certain information of the victory : then drawing it out himself, he said, *I have lived enough, for I die with honour ;* and expired.

§. 152.

The boy listened with a significant attention, and at the conclusion of the story the tears overflowed his eyes. One would think that a hero, a conqueror, a patriot, were objects little adapted

adapted to affect a child ; yet he grieves for the fall of a person, for whom he could conceive an esteem, only on account of those characters ; and the spirited abhorrence he expressed on occasion of this and other passages, shewed the noble fire which had then kindled in him. An incontrovertible proof, that vice and virtue, being exhibited to a child in their genuine colours, and a proper light, he, from their natural impressions on his mind, will become enamoured with the former ; and by a parity of reason, be filled with a detestation of the latter. The good models, which are of such importance in the formation both of the mind and heart, a child chuses for himself, and chuses them with the most just taste ; and to imitate bad models with the knowledge of better, is a flat contradiction ; but, possibly man is naturally made up of contradictions, as *Medea* confesses of herself, *video meliora proboque ; deteriora sequor*. For
self-will

self-will, which, though little qualified to sit at the helm of life, spurns at every good admonition, however amiably delivered; knavery, which uses culpable methods, when the good lead no less surely to his ends; averseness to all beneficial occupations, under an impatience of being idle; these are all equally unnatural, yet are they to be seen in children, and often acting very strongly.

§. 153.

This is a truth, which to be a general maxim of perfect certitude, wants only to be confirmed by the regular experience of children; for men acting and thinking inconsistently, it is not from them that children are to be judged; these being unnatural habits, which a child can contract only by unnatural practices. This having been discussed, we shall now only expose the unnaturalness of from

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this reasoning; without a motive, and without other motives than the representation of good, the will never forms a resolution; this is a law of nature. Conceit is a will, which is sure to determine itself by the reverse of what is advised or recommended, be it right or wrong; *nitimur in vetitum semper cupimusque negata*. So that caprice must be without any motive, or it must be in the pleasure of traversing others, or, whatever be the consequence, of following one's humour. Both are amazingly unnatural!

§. 154.

Experience shews them to be so. If ever a child is obstinate, 'tis from a mistrust of others, or an excess of confidence in itself; and a mistrust may arise, either from the person enjoining, the injunction itself, or even from the manner of delivering it. Notwithstanding

ing any assurance of good intentions, a child will infallibly suspect both the integrity and prudence of the person; if he either solely insists on this power over him, or if he makes use of reasoning, and his arguments are either erroneous or weak. If a slight be put upon his penetration, his sayings, and schemes, which yet shew strictures of uncommon wit and taste; if a wrong, or contemptuous answer be given to his questions, as insignificant frivolities, without regarding how interesting they may be, it is impossible that he should entertain the most favourable idea of our good-will, and integrity. Secondly, the injunction itself may create a suspicion, as when it either abridges him of a pleasure founded in nature, or forces upon him something contrary to nature; for instance, health and strength, being gained and supported by the motion of the body, nature has annexed a pleasure to it; we order him

to be still, either apprehending some danger to him in the motion, or from our own love of quiet. In these, and a hundred such occasions, must not our commands be suspicious to a child? Should not a power, which, otherwise, he looks upon as a coercion upon his freedom, be so managed that he feel it as little as possible? Should we not rather imitate nature in the incentives we use, to keep him in a constant activity? Especially, we should become better acquainted with the nature of a child, to place a due value on every action; nature having proportioned the pleasure of every action to its importance, that is, to its influence towards our destination. For could we recollect what set us so much against scholastic exercises, we should find it to be, that in them the acts of memory and imagination are far more accounted of than taste and genius, to which nature has given a manifest preference.

§. 155.

Thirdly, a well designed command or prohibition may only, by the manner of delivering it, prove a cause of suspicion. The voice, the air, the gesture, give to words another kind of import than their current acceptation, so as to be a disadvantage to the most reasonable demands. If we allow an excessive severity to be as improper for imprinting in children a due regard for us, as an unlimited indulgence ; and that the only way of being beloved, is to love ; the endeavours relating thereto, which are the effects of this love, in order to introduce all possible agreeableness and utility in conversation with children, will of itself indicate the manner of considering on all occasions, whether seriousness or hilarity be most seasonable. Virtue begets esteem, and of the virtues, justice is not the least.

When diffidence of others begins to gather strength in the heart of a child, his self-confidence keeps pace with it. He sees, he feels men to have a design upon his happiness ; he imagines he can trust no body better than himself, as no body is so much his friend as himself ; and this confidence, which a child thus entertains of himself, is strengthened several ways ; first, by the servile complaisance of those about him, whereby he becomes too sensible of the disparity which birth has made betwixt them ; he sees the importance of his favour to them by their assuming every shape to gain it. But the only means whereby a child, amidst the highest advantages of birth, can conciliate the affections of mankind, is by his personal merit.

§. 156.

A second cause of a child's self-confidence, is the hurry and anxiety we throw ourselves

ourselves in upon any little appearance of danger to him. Does he shew any merit, or so much as endeavours to distinguish himself by a commendable behaviour, and to deserve our affections, we then cannot exceed in tenderness and endearments. But let us beware of such an effusion of fondness, as would at once fill him with a consciousness of all his worth ; as it will only relax his spirit and possess him with a most false and pernicious imagination of himself, in that he is to be regarded abstractedly from merit ; and of love, that it is only an effervescence in the blood.

Thirdly, when from want of experience, or from indifference, we are not able to penetrate into the views of a child, which he is very artful in concealing, the natural consequences are a contempt of us, and a towering confidence of his ability to carry any point whatever, in defiance of opposition.

§. 157.

Now separating from conceit all which it has gathered from a wrong education, distrust of others, and an inflated confidence in himself ; all that remains, is a certain reluctance in the mind, which serves as a counterpoise to the external impressions, that it be not affected by them, above that degree of good and evil, in which consists the differences of things ; and here, obstinacy is the best quality in a child, it is that estimable incredulity, which defers to no arguments, but those which are precise and convictive, that firmness united with the force requisite to the accomplishments of good purposes ; that fortitude and resolution, which treads difficulties under foot ; that jealousy and noble sensibility of any infringement on his right. To suppress this obstinacy, is not only to strip a child of its whole

whole merit, but, the consequence is infallible, to make of him either a machine or a villain.

§. 158.

The difference, possibly it is the only difference, observable in children, as to their inclinations, and of which, the seat is in their natural constitution, in some torpid and faint, in others impetuous and strong, enables us satisfactorily to account for the different effects of a like management. A child of vehement passions, who acts from heat and precipitancy, has naturally a greater share of incredulity, firmness, resolution and sensibility, than another naturally phlegmatic, and who goes about things with more tranquility. If outward violence be considered as a preponderating force, which works on the mind in an opposite direction ; fear, the natural effect of

of it, will be felt by the one, as well as the other ; but more sensibly by one than the other, according to their different firmness and opposition against such violence. Both at length must submit, but the degrees of fear, which in one shall make him give all over for lost, and absolutely relinquish measures on which he had set his mind, does not totally overthrow the resolves of the other ; he tries every secret way to attain his end. Both will be discouraged, and lower their crests ; but one will be fluctuating and timorous ; the other wily, versatile and dishonest ; the former, of himself, will be next to nothing ; the latter, by himself will be every thing.

§. 259.

Experience informs us, of how little avail the determinations of reason are against the vehemence of the passions and inclinations ;

tions ; yet do all systems of morality, and indeed justly, maintain, that without an absolute subjection of the senses to reason, there can be no virtuous constitution of mind. Reason, and a clear insight into the analogy of actions, and the consequences of them, must, according to this doctrine, be the means of guarding the passions, and bringing the sensitive part into order. But these same passions, and this sensitive part, must be allowed to obfuscate the eye of reason, to divert the impressions of argument, and thus all these means become of no effect. And is it to be expected, that flaccid determinations should prove a check to a vehement inclination ; when even the opposition of sensations, which act on the mind with another kind of energy, is seen to fail ? Lastly, Is reason in its distinctions concerning good and evil clear of absolutely partiality ? Does not reason, from different particular cases, select a general

neral principle ; and from this principle, in which should lie the stress of its determinations, make innumerable exceptions in particular cases ? At least, in all cases where the votes are equal ; and these are the most, the prevalent inclinations will ever turn the scale.

§. 160.

What also are passions and evil inclinations, but prépossession, error and caprice, in respect of good and evil, which differ from those we entertain, in respect of truth and falsehood, only, that they much sooner acquire their pernicious strength, act more forcibly, and render our wretchedness more certain ? Whether the earth be globular, or compressed at its poles ? Whether the whole surface of it be inhabited or not ? Whether it be the fixed center of our solar system, or whether carried round by the sun ? Now howsoever these, and a hundred

hundred such questions are solved, is no great matter to us. Though these solutions, be they what they will, do not in the least affect our existence here; yet, after once declaring on one side or the other, truth is not the point; they must be very powerful arguments indeed, which can induce us to divest ourselves of such prepossession, make an ingenuous recantation; the argument on both sides is before our eyes, and we are able to weigh them. Quite otherwise is it with the prepossessions of passion; these depend immediately on the sensations, and thus also may be groundless, and the objects which excited them be but apparently good, or possibly evil; yet shall not the whole world persuade us, that what we feel to be pleasant, or unpleasant, is not so, but, in reality, the contrary; and he who goes about to combat our prepossessions, civilly gives us to understand, that we are not in our right senses.

§. 161.

That the pre-possessions of the heart are much stronger, and as such more dangerous, than those of the understanding, is evident ; and if the cure of the latter be difficult, of the former, it is next to an impossibility. But children, those only hopes of better times, those innocent amiable little creatures, they are without prepossessions. But how long ? Should we delight in them so much, if they did not early shew some certain minute peccadilloes ? In short, they have no prepossessions, or those they have, are, by established custom, of our introducing. The opposition, which so early breaks forth in a child, and which we immediately term humour, as in many cases proceeding from it ; this opposition manifests, that the impressions from outward things must be distinguished,

guished, not only according to their nature, but also their degree. But if this difference be perceivable in the things themselves, a child must have a right sense of good and evil ; that is, he must delight in good, as good, and according to its degree of goodness, as much as he abhors evil. And with what means is a child furnished for virtue, and happiness its dependant, if his sensations, to him the only test of good and evil, and which gather strength by frequent repetition, and thus grow to passions and appetites ; if, I say, these sensations do not, in their degrees of vivacity, correspond in a just proportion with the like degree of the good and evil of the outward object.

§. 162.

The whole system of morality towards a child, is reducible to a few points. His evil inclinations are either the malignant, or such as arise from an injury ; for these
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the only remedy is to overlook them, and bring him acquainted with the lenient sentiments ; or they are irrational, that is, such as have their source in errors committed by ourselves, in respect of our superiority in making it too cheap, or rating it too high, or building it on a wrong foundation. This is an error into which a child never falls, but when, through an austere imperiousness, a timorous tenderness, or a mean indulgence, either degrade his worth too low, or we enhance it beyond his deserts ; or when we ourselves idolize those things, which avarice, voluptuousness and ambition have deified ; and thereby, he imbibes the frenzy, and unhappily builds an estimate of himself on the very worst foundation.

The E N D.







